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1．Hartshorne　and　Hisamatsu　in　Terms　of　the　Task　of
　　　Metaphysical　Anthropology　Today
　　　　　My　intention　in　this　article　is　to　study　comparatively
Hartshorne　and　Hisamatsu　as　they　investigate　metap勿sゴcα〃ッ
human　nature．　Neither　of　them　believes　one　can　understand
human　nature　on　a　purely　human　basis．　One　has　to　thoroughly
break　through　humanistic　anthropology　in　order　to　grasp　humanity
in　its　depths．　As　Hartshorne　contends，“Life　is　enjoyed　as　it　is
lived；but　its　eventual　worth　will　consist　in　the　contribution　it
has　made　to　something　more　enduring　than　any　animal，　or　than
any　species　of　animal．”l　In　this　sense，　the　life　of　humanity　is
comprehensible　only　as　religious．　And，　significantly　enough，
according　to　Hartshorne，“he　is　most　religious　who　is　certain　of
but　one　thing，　the　world℃mbracing　love　of　God．”2
　　　　　Hisamatsu　is　also　a　firm　believer　in　the　metaphysical
foundation　of　human　nature．　However，　what　he　means　by　the
foundation　is　not　the　God　of　Christian　theism　or　the　theistic
Buddha，　such　as　Amida　Buddha．　He，　too，　breaks　through
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　ナso－called　humanistic　anthropology，　including　Kant　s　philosophy
of　morals　and　Max　Scheler’sphenomenology　of　religion．　But
the　lever，　by　means　of　which　he　wants　to　overcome　that　type
of　anthropology，　is　the　Zen　Buddhistic　truth，　Formless　Self．　It
is　in　this　sense　that　he　says，“One　cannot　understand　Godhead
unless　one　utterly　dies　to　humanity”30r“Godhead　does　not
arise　from　humanity　nor　depends　upon　it，　but　the　reverse”
（TM，214）．
　　　　　Charles　Hartshorne　has　until　today，　now　in　his　late　90’s，
2been　the　representative　figure　of　the　second　generation　of
Whiteheadian　process　philosophy　in　North　America．　For　this
reason　process　philosophy／theology　movement　in　North　America，
now　outreaching　to　Europe　and　Japan，　is　called　by　the　double
name，　WhiteheadiarHartshornean．　Shin’ichi　Hisamatsu，　on　the
other　hand，　who　passed　away　at　the　age　of　90　in　1980，　has
been　regarded　as　one　of　the　greatest　Zen　philosophical　leaders，
along　with　Keiji　Nishitani，4　in　contemporary　Japan　belonging　to
the　second　generation　of　the　Nishida　schoo1．　Both　of　them　have
radically　humanized　their　respective　mentors’thoughts　while
never　losing　sight　of　their　primal　metaphysical　traits，　as　mentioned
above．　Hartshome　has　laid　down　the　foundation　of　his　metaphysical
anthropology　in　the　notion　of‘‘enduring　individua1”as　apPropriated
by　deity；hence　all　the　important　anthropological　issues　are
㏄nteIed　upon，　and　are　solved　by，　the　pivotal　poin1ンーthe　“immancence
of　God．”On　the　contrary，　Hisamatsu　based　his　thought　conceming
human　nature　upon　the　Buddha－nature　intrinsic　to　all　human
beings，　that　is，　upon　Formless　Self－to　use　his　own　terminology．
That　is　to　say，　the　notion　of“self”is　pivotal　and　transformative
in　his　thinking　to　such　an　extent　that　he　dares　to　conceive　of
the　metaphysical　ultimate－which　Nishida　called“absolute
Nothingness，”“unity　of　opposites，”or“hαsho”（place）－in　terms
of　“self．”
　　　　　Concomitant　with　the　different　pivotal　and　transformative
points　in　their　respective　schemes　of　metaphysical　anthropology，
Hartshorne　is　a　theistic　personalist，　whereas　Hisamatsu　is　a　Zen
a－theistic　transpersonalist．　This　does　not，　however，　mean　that
they　do　not　share　anything　in　common　in　the　matter　of　metaphysical
anthropology．　On　the　contrary，　they　share　in　the　understanding
of　human　nature　as　involving，　I　assume，　three　axiological
categories，　i．e．，intrinsic，　intended　instrumental，　and　pragmatic
values．　The　axiological　dimension　of　the　universe，　especially　of
human　nature（or　nature　as　it　is　lived　by　and　as　humans），　is
important　insofar　as　it　both　includes　in　itself　and　presupposes
the　ontological　or　properly　metaphysical　dimension，　the　dimension
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which　is　most　typically　characterized　by　Whitehead　in　his
notion　of“Creativity”or　by　Nishida　in　his　conception　of“unity
of　opposites．”　The　former　dimension　concerns　itself　with　life　of
the　universe，　especially　human　life，　as　it　is　prehended　by　a
certain　subject　or　subjects，　whereas　the　latter　dimension　is
related　to　the　ultimate　general　principle　of　life　of　the　universe，
by　virtue　of　which　life　is　life，　and　by　virtue　of　which　each　act
of　prehension　is　viable．
　　　　　Ishall　study　Hisamatsu’sview　of　human　nature　in　Section
II　and　Hartshorne’sin　Section　III．　As　shall　be　shown，　they
both　try　respectively　to　solve　the　fundamental　anthropological
problem：how　to　synthesize　self－concern　and　concern－for－others
in　anthropology．　They　both　recognize　that　self－concern　in　its
authentic　form　is　possible　only　by　the　power　of　redemption－by
the　power　of　Formless　Self　in　Hisamatsu’scase，　and　by　the
divine　power　in　Hartshorne’scase．　It　follows，　as　both　of　them
clearly　see，　that　self－concern，　realizing　itself　as　the　intrinsic
value　of　human　nature，　necessarily　entails　concernイor－others，
10ve　or　compassion　as　the　embodiment　of　the　intended　instrumental
value　of　human　nature，　thus　achieving　the　synthesis　of　the　two
concems．　Up　to　this　point　they　are　alike．
　　　　　　However，　it　is　when　it　comes　to　discussing　the　pragmatic
value　that　their　otherwise　similar　metaphysical　anthropologies，
as　we　shall　elucidate，　diverge　from　each　other．　Hisamatsu　is
well　capable　of　explicating　the　livable　aspect　of　the　value　but
not　its　rationally　defensible　aspect．　On　the　contrary，　Hartshome
superbly　accounts　for　the　rationally　defensible　aspect　of　the
value　but　cannot　fully　articulate　the　dynamics　of　the　livalble
aspect，　the　dynamics　of　going　beyond　the　rational一α〃n－eXistential
antinomy　here　at　the　present　moment．
　　　　　Their　respective　abilities　come　from　their　favorite　knowledges
of　either　the　metaphysical　ultimate（i．e．，Formless　Self）or　of
the　religious　ultimate（i．e．，the　immanent　God）；and　their
respecitive　weaknesses　result　from　their　lack　of　the　knowledge
of　the　other　side　of　the　ultimates．　That　is　to　say，　Hisamatsu’s
4ability　of　explicating　the　livable　aspect　is　guaranteed　by　his
knowledge　of　Formless　Self　as　the　intrinsic　value　of　human
nature，　whereas　Hartshorne’smerit　of　rationally　defending　the
pragmatic　value　of　human　nature　is　undergirded　by　his　insight
into　the　al1－embracing　love　of　God，　the　love’翌?奄モ?@alone　can
make　the　intended　instrumental　value　really　instrumental　for　the
future；and　their　inabilities　are　for　the　reverse　reasons．
　　　　　　The　above　is　a　cross－cultural　re－discovery　of　the　merit
and　demerit　of　the　East　and　the　West　based　upon　an　axiological
analysis　of　human　nature　in　the　thoughts　of　tWo　major　representatives
of　the　two　cultures，　Hisamatsu　and　Hartshorne．　Our　method　of
study　deployed　in　this　work　is　that　of　comparative　articulation，
in　the　sense　of　articulating　one　thinker’ssystem　of　thought　by
extensive　confrontation　with　some　other’s．　As　one　of　the　major
results　of　the　study，　it　turns　out　that　there　are　at　least　two
ways　of　coping　with　the　problem　of　modern　times　that　explodes
here　and　there　even　after　relinquishing　heteronomy　or　theonomy
of　the　medieval　type，　i．e．，the　problem　of　how　to　break　through
the　dilemma　of　autonomy：free　but　purposeless．
　　　　　　One　is　the　way　shown　by　Hisamatsu　in　his　doctrine　of
Zen　a－theism，　the　way　of　breaking　through　modernity　deep
beneath　the　ground　of　purposeless　modemity　toward　an　authentic
purposelessness　or　bottomlessness，　Formless　Self．　The　other　is
the　way　presented　by　Hartshome　in　his　doctrine　of　neo－classical
theism　or　panentheism，　the　way　of　overcoming　modernity　high
above　the　culmination　of　modern　freedom　toward　a　real　reason
for　freedom－cum－purpose，　the　all－embracing　love　of　God．　Either
way　is　an　invitation　to　post－modern　axiology　or　a　truly　secular
but　at　the　same　time　highly　religious　love　of　life　of　the　world．
　　　　　　But　one　serious　question　may　finally　arise：Can’twe
synthesize　the　two　ways　in　some　way　or　another？That　is　to
say：Can’twe　be　purposeless　in　the　fashion　of　Hisamatsu’sZen
a－theism　and　yet　purposive　in　the　manner　of　Hartshorne’s
neo－classical　theism　at　the　same　time？Surely，　that　is　one　of
the　most　crucial　questions　as　regards　the　task　of　theological
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consideration　of　life　of　the　world　today．　However，　there　might
be　no　easy　answers　to　this　question　for　us　uη1ess　we　sont翻ze漉召
〃0∂le〃20f　axiologツcarefu〃y　enough　inα〃ゴ’S　detailS，紘lziding伽
〃吻’競c，intended　izastm〃2翻α1，α勿1加gmatic　ralues．
　　　　　But　one　hint　is　given　by　Hartshorne　when　he　states　as
follows：
Goodness　is　the　self　in　its　purposes　transcending　the
personal　future　and　making　itself　trustee　for　others（according
to　religion　，　finally，　trustee　for　God）．　In　this　transcendence
of　the　personal　there　is　a　kind　of‘peace’or‘Nirvana，’
an　escape　from　the　agonies　of　egotism．　This　peace　is　the
only　essential　reward　of　virtue，　It　is　in　the　present　and　is
not　a　looked－for　reward　in　the　eventual　future．　Rather，
so　long　as　one’sown　future　is　taken　as　the　important
matter，　there　is　no　peace．5
This　hint　corresponds，　to　my　mind，　to　the　following　words　of
Hisamatsu　in　the　interview　for　the　magazine　Sekai（The　World，
Fe　bruary　1977）：
Ialways　say　at　home，“1’11　never　die．1’11　never　die
because　I　am　F［Formless　Self］．1’ll　never　die・because
I’ve　transcended　time　and　space．”Nobody　is　likely　to
understand　me，　nobody．．．［laughter］．　It’susual，　though，
that　nobody　understands　me．　I　never　mind　indeed　my
own　death．　For　I　have　such　an　important　work　to　do，
Post－Modernist　Movement！Unless　this　Movement　works
out　some　answers，　our　world　cannot　become　a　true
world－this　is　my　firm　belief．（p．241；trans．　mine．）
　　　　　　　　　　　りlI．　Hisamatsu　s　Theory　of　Human　Nature
As　is　often　said　in　Buddhism，“ln　both　self－benefit　and
6benefiting　others　lies　the　perfection　of　Awakening　and
practice．”One’sown　redemption　is　not　everything，　for
that　cannot　be　considered　true　redemption．　Instead　of
being　merely　subjective　and　individual，　true　redemption
ought　to　have　an　objective　validity　apPlicable　to　any
person．　Otherwise，　as　redemption，　the　saying“In　both
self－benefit　and　benefiting　others　lies　the　pe㎡ection　of
Awakening　and　practice”would　not　apply　to　it．6
　　　　　　Thus　writes　Hisamatsu　in　an　essay　entitled‘‘Ultimate
Crisis　and　Resurrection，　Part　II：Redemption”（originally　written
in　1969）．　As　is　clear　in　this　passage，　the　opposition　between
self－benefit　and　benefiting　others　can　be　resolved　in　the　event　of
the　Buddhist　redemption　according　to　Hisamatsu’stheory　of
human　nature．　But　how？What　is，　generally　speaking　，　the
ontological　basis　for　breaking　through　the　opposition　in　human
nature　of　self－concem　and　concern－for－others？In　this　section，　I
will　scrutinize　how　Hisamatsu　tries　coherently　to　answer　this
question　，　in　terms　of　a　three－dimentional　value－structure　of
human　nature，　consisting　of　the“intrinsic，”　“intended　instrumental，”
and“pragmatic”values．
A．　Human　1＞召ture　in　Its　．lntri’2zsz’c　Value
　　　　　For　Hisamatsu　human　nature　constitutes　a　three－dimentional
problem：it　can　best　be　expressed　in　terms　of　depth，　width，　and
length．　By　depth　he　means　probing　the　human　being　as　deep　as
the　bottom　of　his　or　her　self－awareness　and，　finally，　awakening
to　the　Formless　Selア．7　From　the　viewpoint　of　Zen　enlightenment
as　awakening　to　the　Fomless　Self，　human　nature　is　accordingly
to　be　considered　as　a　Self－to－self　relationship；it　is　not　a　static
nature　as“substance”（in　the　Cartesian　sense　of　a　being　who
need　nothing　other　than　itself　in　order　to　exist）．　This　Self－to－self
relationship　we　might　call　the“intrinsic　value”of　human
nature．　Human　nature　in　its　depth　is　already　value－pregnant
even　if　it　is　considered　irrespective　of，　or　prior　to，　its　active，
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purposive　relationship　to　others．
　　　　　　This　reminds　me　of　Hartshorne’selaboration　on　the
intrinsic　value　of　experiencing　as　follows：
The　basic　value　is　the　intrinsic　value　of　experiencing，　as
aunity　of　feeling　inclusive　of　whatever　volition　and
thought　the　experience　contains，　and　exhibiting　harmony
or　beauty．　If　we　know　what　experience　is，　at　its　best　or
most　beautiful，　then　and　only　then　can　we　know　how　it
is　right　to　act；for　the　value　of　action　is　in　what　it
contributes　to　experiences．（CSPM，303）
　　　　　1．The　Bnddha一ハlature　In　more　detail，　the　intrinsic　value　of
human　nature　for　Hisamatsu　means　that“all　beings　are　of　the
Buddha（i．e．，Awakened）nature．”From　this　standpoint　of
Buddhism，“redemption　is　already　present　in　every　person．
Sentient　beings　are，　z｛tithoztt　excePtion，　origine〃ツsaued”　（“UCR”，　II，
38；italics　Hisamatsu’s）．　By　this　Hisamatsu　means　that　redemption
is　mot　what　one　is　given　from　outside，　that　is　a　favor　by　external
blessing　in　the　form　of　revelation　from　Heaven　or　of　Grace
（“UCR”，　II，38）．He　rejects　any　heteronomous　or　theonomous
motivations　in　this　regard．
　　　　　To　be　sure，　Hisamatsu　admits　that　at　present　sentient
beings　are　not　yet　awake　to　their　Buddha－nature．　Yet，　he　holds
that　it　is　nevertheless　true　that　they　are　the　Buddha，　without
any　distinction　between　the　savior　and　the　saved（“UCR”，　II，
38）．What　is　essential　to　his　doctrine　of　redemption（and　to　his
view　of　the　intrinsic　value　of　human　nature）is　the　fact　that　the
ground　for　the　human　being’sredemption　is　basically　inherent
in　him／her，　and　that　its　presence　is　the　basic　or　ultimate
moment　in　the　human　being，　which　makes　his／her　redemption
possible（“UCR”，　II，38）．　In　short，　as　he　affirms，　Buddhism
teaches　that　everyone　has　the　possibility　of　being　saved（“UCR”，
II，38）．
　　　　　This　is　quite　contrary　to　the　Christian　belief　that“since
8all　have　sinned　and　fall　short　of　the　glory　of　God，　they　are
justified　by　his　grace　as　a　gift，　through　the　redemption　which　is
in　Christ　Jesus，　whom　God　put　forward　as　an　expiation　by　his
blood，　to　be　received　by　faith”（Rom．3：23－25），However，　if　we
take　into　account　the　fact　that　what　Hisamatsu　means　by　the
term“垂盾唐唐奄b奄撃奄狽凵his　the　metaphysical　potency　of　existence，　but
not　human　possibility　for　progress　as　it　has　been　believed　by
moderns（cf．　TM，216－7，225－6），we　will　not　be　misguided　by
his　discussion　of　the　Buddha－nature．　His　bitter　criticism　of
modern　humanism　as　well　as　of　medieval　heteronomy／theonomy
testifies　to　this　deeper　intention　in　his　usage　of　the　term‘‘possibility．”
　　　　　This　can　be　made　explicit　and　intelligible　to　Westerners，　I
believe，　by　Hartshorne’sprocess　view　of　the　principle　of　action
for　a　truly　rational　animal　as　the“appeal　of　life　for　one’spresent
life，　reality，　or　self　rather　than　the　apPeal　of　a　self　for　that
same　self；or　even　the　appeal　of　other　selves　for　the　own　self”
（CSPM，　xx；italics　mine）．8　By　life　Hartshorne　means“creative
synthesis”or“creativity”as　the“ultimate　abstract　principle　of
existence”iCSPM，　xv）．　This　principle　has　broken　through　the
‘‘奄р?＝@of　substance，　or　individual　thing　or　person，　taken　as　not
further　analysable　or　reducible”（CSPM，　xix），　i．e．，the　idea
which　has　broken　down　in　microphysics，　which　is　dispensable
in　cosmology，　and　which　is，　as　Buddhism　discovered　two
thousand　years　ago，　inadequate　in　ethics　and　religion　（ゴ1％ゴ．）．
　　　　　What　Hartshome　means　by　his　notion　of“creative　synthesis”
of　all　beings　in　the　universe，　including　God，　is　the　same　thing
as　the　Buddhist　analysis　of“substance”into　units－events　or
momentary　states．9　This　notion，　if　it　is　taken　in　its　original，
Whiteheadian　signification　of　all－encompassing　Creativity，　could
further　correspond　to　Hisamatsu’snotion　of　the　Self　or　the
True　Self　insofar　as　this　latter　notion　signifies　the　totality　of
the　universe　as　it　is　concrescing　and　realizing　itself　at　the
present　moment　as　the　human　self．　However，　the　fact　is　rather
that　here　emerges　one　great　difference　between　them：for　the
Buddhist　atheist　Hisamatsu　the　True　Self　is　the　ultimate，
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all－encompassing　Reality，　whereas　for　the　neo－classical　theist
Hartshorne　the　idea　that　love，　as　it　is　eminently　fulfilled　as
deity，　seeks　what　is　more　than　love，　say　the　formless　Nothingness
or　Void　or　Absolute　Beauty，　is　a“philosophical　superstition”
（NTfOT，106）．This　is　because　for　Hartshorne　God　is　the　only
all－inclusive　Reality　in　the　universeαs　love．
　　　　　2．The　raison　4’倉tre　of　Re〃gt’on　It　may　follow　from　this　that
one　denies，　like　Hartshorne，　that　Buddhism　can　offer　an　explicit
alternative　to　the　theistic　version　of　the　all－inclusive　reality
because　the　Buddhist　refuses　to　rationalize　what　is　given　in
“satori”or　salvation．　Then　one，　like　Hartshorne，　may　come　to
this　conclusion　concerning　Buddhism：“His［the　Buddhist’s］
doctrine　is　an　intuitionism，　not　a　speculative　account　of　the
Whole”（NTfOT，22）；or“‘Dependent　origination’and　the　goal
of　bringing　all　things　to　buddhahood　suggest　asymmetry，　but
the　relation　of　this　to　nimena　is　sheer　mystery，　so　far　as　I　can
　　　，，10see．
　　　　　　However，　it　is　precisely　at　this　point　that　Hisamatsu
defends　Buddhist　intuitionism　in　terms　of　the　raison　d’2tre　of
religion．　That　is，　he　vindicates　the　intrinsic　validity　of　Zen
enlightenment　for　the　salvation　of　humanity　as　such．　For
Hisamatsu，　as　one　who　seeks　religion，　is　of　the　opinion　that　if
religion　were　without　a　raison　4’2tre　not　merely　for　him　as　an
individual　but　for　man　per　se，　he　would　not　be　able　to　have　a
firm　commitment　to　that　religion　but　rather　would　readily
relinquish　it（“UCR”，1，16）．For　him　the　raison　d’倉tre　of
religion　is　internally　related　to　this　question：Where　in　man
does　one　find　the“moment”whereby　he　needs　religion？That　is
to　say，　Hisamatsu　is　concerned　with　the　question　of　the　place
where　in　humankind－not　in　a　particular　individual－one　finds
the　reason　that　religion　must　exist（“UCR”，1，16）．
　　　　　It　is　obvious　to　Hisamatsu　that　what　he　calls　theonomous
religion　of　the　medieval　type　as　well　as　types　of　religion　which
precede　it，　such　as　animism　and　fetishism，　belong　to　the　past
and　have　no　raison　d’2tre　today．　For　ours　is　the　age　when
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autonomous　man’sself－awareness　is　the　subject；the　present
age　is　the　age　of　humanism（“UCR”，1，17）．Then　Hisamatsu’s
quest　for　the　raison　d’2tre　of　religion　has　no　other　context　than
criticism　of　humanism　itself，　so　that　it　will　become　criticism　of
the　religion　that　is　established　on　the　ground　of　humanism
（“UCR”，1，18）．
　　　　　　At　any　rate，　Hisamatsu’squest　for　the　raison　d’2tre　of
religion，　contrary　to　Hartshorne’scritical　assumption　that
Buddhist　insight　into　the　Formless　Seif　has　no　Ultimate　philosophical
basis，　demonstrates　a　dynamic　togetherness　of　religious　and
philosophical　concerns，　Interestingly　enough，　however，　this　is
unwittingly　analogous　to　the　case　of　Hartshorne’sneo－classical
theism　that　has　established　itself　through　a　radical　break－through
of　both　traditional　transcendental　theism（e．g．，Thomas　Aquinas）
and　humanistic　naturalism（e．9．，John　Dewey）（see　his　Beyond
Humant’sm，　which　we　shall　discuss　later）．
　　　　　3．The他1ゴ8諺幽ousルloment　in　1動㎜纏ッNow，　it　is　time　to　see
that　the　raison　d’2tre　of　religion　for　modern　man　is　rooted　in
what　Hisamatsu　calls　the“religious　moment　in　man”but　not　in
external，　heteronomous　or　theonomous　motivations，　as　in　the
case　of　pre－modern　man．　However，　this　religious“moment”in
humanity，　as　Hisamatsu　critically　analyzes　it，　first　takes　the
reversed　form，“sin　and　death．”This　I　might　call　the　o勿s
alienum－to　use　Luther’sterminology－of　human　nature　in　its
intrinsic　value，　or　of　the　Buddha－nature．　Hisamatsu　writes：
These　two，　sin　and　death，　which　ordinarily　are　separately
considered，　since　they　are　each　spoken　of　as　the　single　or
the　grave“moment”for　religion，　can　both　be　said　to　be
the　inevitable　for　man，　and　to　open　up　man’slimitation．
In　other　words，　when　the　moment　for　religiom　in　man　is
said　to　be　sin　and　death，　this　means　that　sin　and　death
constitute　man’slimitation，　and　that　they　are　what　man
can　never　overcome．（“UCR”，1，19）
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　　　　　As　is　clear　in　the　above　passage，（1）Hisamatsu　is　not，
like　humanists，　optimistic　of　the　goodness　of　human　nature．
Rather，　he　recognizes　humanity’sradical　limitation，　sin　and
death．（2）Yet，　his　ultimate　standpoint　is　that　of　the　Formless
Self　of　humanity，　or　of　the　intrinsic　value　of　human　nature．
His　philosophical　insight　into　the　Whole　or　the　totality　of　the
universe－that　is，　his　metaphysics－is　constituted　by　the　paradoxical
unity　of　these　two　seemingly　conflicting　propositions．　In　this
regard，　I　would　say，　his　Zen　philosophy　is　a　post－modern
reinterpretation　of　the　Mahayana　Buddhist　logic　of　the　hannya
soku－hi，　or　ofρ勉ブ勉一intuition：Ais　not　A　and　therefore　A　is
A．11Hisamatsu，　I　believe，　has　refuted　in　this　way　Hartshorne’s
criticism　of　Buddhism　mentioned　earlier．
　　　　　　This　observation　of　mine　is　confirmed　by　Hisamatsu’s
thoroughgoing　analysis　of“sin　and　death”　as　constituting　the
religious“moment”in　humanity　and　as　necessitating　redemption
of　humanity　in　a　paradoxical　fashion．　What　I　mean　by　this　is　as
follows．　Hisamatsu　holds　that　sin　exists　in　science　and　art　as
well　as　in　morality．　This　is　because　he　believes　we　cannot　be
free　from　the　opposition　between　falsity　and　truth　in　the　world
of　science，　or　the　contrast　between　ugliness　and　beauty　in　the
world　of　art，　even　if　we　can　get　rid　of　sin　in　the　moral　sense．
According　to　Hisamatsu，　sin　therefore　ought　to　be　extended　to
include　the　problem　of　reason　per　se（“UCR”，1，20）．　That　is　to
say，　sin　arises　because　humanity　has　ultimate　antinomy　in　the
very　structure　of　reason，　covering　the　whole　field　of　humanity
（“UCR”，1，21）．　In　this　sense，　Hisamatsu　feels　that“so－called
original　sin　really　does　exist（although　its　myth　is　far　from
convincing　to　us　today）”（ibid．）．This　sin　he　identifies　as
“man’唐高盾唐煤@basic　kind　of　ignorance”（伽4．）．
　　　　　　Likewise，　Hisamatsu　deepens　the　notion　of　death　to　the
extent　that　it　includes　the　very　basic　antinomy　of　existence，
life－and－death．　One　should　fear　not　death　but　life－and－death，
or　origination－and－extinction，　which　is　not　necessarily　limited
to　humanity’slife－and－death　but　applies　to　everything．　Thus，
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finally，　one　must　bring　death　to　the　very　point　of　existence－and
－nonexistence．（“UCR”，1，23）．　What　is　called　Great　Death　in
Zen　is　nothing　other　than　this　ultimate　state　of　death，
　　　　　　By　sin　Hisamatsu　means　the　ultimate　antinomy　of　the
rational－irrational，　which　is　found　in　the　structure　of　reason；
and　by　death　he　means　the　ultimate　antinomy　of　existence－and－
nonexistence，　which　lies　at　the　bottom　of　life．　Both　antinomies　，
however，　are　one　in　their　concrete　reality；they　are　indivisible．
Fbr　instance，　the　reason　why　the　ultimate　antinomy　of　lifeandTdeath
becomes　pain　or　suffe　ri　ng　in　us　is　that　we　judge　so（cf．“UCR”，
1，24）．Thus　the　one　final　ultimate　antinomy，　which　includes
in　itself　reason，　value，　and　existence，　really　presses　upon　us
and　constitutes　the　true“moment”of　religion（cf．“UCR”，1，
24）．121n　the　midst　of　this　moment　of　religion　one’swhole
existence　becomes　a“great　doubting－mass”－the　one　which
completely　differs　quantitatively　and　qualitatively　from　the
“doubt”in　Descartes’1）e　omnibus　dubitandum（“Concerning　the
Necessity　of　Doubting　Everything”）（“UCR”，1，26）．
　　　　　This　moment　of　religion　entangled　in　the　final，　tota1，　and
all－inclusive　doubt　I　would　like　to　call　the　reversed　expression　of
salvation，　or　of　the　True　Self．　For　that　which　goes　beyond
good　and　evil，　or　beyond　existence　and　nonexistence，　is　the
on’№煤fnal　nature　of　the　Self．　In　this　connection　Hisamatsu　quotes
remarks　by　the　Sixth　Partiarch　of　Zen　in　China，　Hui－neng：“At
the　very　time　you　do　not　think　of　good　or　evil．．．［you　have］
your　original　face”；and“At　the　very　time　you　do　not　think　of
good　or　evil，　please　give　back　to　me　the　Face　that　you　had
before　your　parents　gave　birth　to　you．”The　self　prior　to　birth
from　one’sparents　means　the　Self　without　the　nature　of　life－
and－death，　human　nature　in　its　intrinsic　value．13
B．　Human　1＞bture　in　Its　Intended　Instmmental　Value
　　　　　Hisamatsu　views　the　field　of“width”or　the　standpoint　of
all　humankind　as　commensurate　with　the　fact　that　we　all　have
Buddha－nature，　that　we　are　originally　the　Buddha，　and　that　in
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this　respect　human　beings　are　all　equal．　He　even　thinks　that
the　True　Self　may　well　be　called　Creator　because“God　or
Buddha　exists　not　outside　but　inside　the　Self　and　because　it　is
present”i“UCR”，1，29）．　This　understanding　or　use　of　the
term“Creator”may　sound　strange　from　the　Christian　point　of
view．　But　it　would　be　intelligible，　in　my　view，　if　we　took　it　to
mean　something　like　Whitehead’snotion　of“creativity，”because
this　latter　notion　includes　in　itself　God　as　its　primordial　exempli－
fication．　Hisamatsu’sprovocative　proposition，“lt　is　not　that　in
the　presence　of　an　external　God　we　are　equal，　which　would　be
heteronomy”（“UCR”，1，29），　would　therefore　also　be　intelligible．
　　　　　By　virtue　of　this　immediate　connection　of　what　he　calls
“width”with　the　Formless　Self，　Hisamatsu　proceeds　to　assert
that　the　enlightened　person　is　liberated　from　the　egoism　of
nationality　or　race，　expands　himself　or　herself　to　include　the
entirety　of　the　human　race，　and　thus　stands　on　the　perspective
of“brotherly　love　for　all　humanity”（“UCR”，1，12）．That　is　to
say，　he　is　now　attempting　to　conceive　of　human　nature　in　its
intended　instrumental　value　from　the　perspective　of　the　Formless
Self．　Is　he　justifiable　in　this　attempt？
　　　　　My　answer　to　this　question　is　both　yes　and　no．（1）Yes，
in　the　sense　that　Hisamatsu　knows　clearly　that　the　intended
instrumental　value，　or　Goodness，　of　human　nature　lies　in　its
contribution　to　the　enrichment　of　the　intrinsic　value　of　humanity，
Beauty．　It　is　noteworthy　that　Hisamatsu　in　this　regard　is　based
upon　the　metaphysical　insight　that　the　source　of　the　Buddha－
with，forrn　called　Amida－Buddha　is　the　D物禰即，　the　metaphysically
ultimate　Buddha－body．14　He　quotes（“Zen”，31）apassage　each
from　Shinran’sYuishinsho－mon’i（Notes　on‘Essentials　of　Faith
Alone’）and　linen－－hont’－shO（On　Naturalness）as　follows：
The　Dharma々のαis　without　shape，　without　form，　and
accordingly，　beyond　the　Ieach　of　the　mind，　beyond　description
in　words．　That　which　takes　form　and　comes　forth　from
this　Formles＄－Suchness　is　called　theσ加翅一dharma々のα．
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The　Supreme　Buddha　is　without　form．　Because　it　is
without　form，　it　is　called　Self－effected．　When　we　represent
it　with　form，　it　cannot　then　be　spoken　of　as　the　Supreme
躍舶㎜．It　is　to　make　known　this　Ultimate　Formlessness
that　we　speak　of　Amida－Buddha．
To　paraphrase　the　above　into　my　own　language，　Amida　is
‘‘ 撃盾凾≠戟h@to　the　Dhar〃iaka．yαthrough　and　through　in　that　he
makes　the　D勿朋α々のαknown　to　the　world．
　　　　　（2）However，　I　would　reply　no　to　the　above　question，　on
the　other　hand，　in　the　sense　that　Hisamatsu　fails　to　differentiate
between　the　proper　religious　source　of　the　intended　instrumental
value　of　humanity，　i．e．，Amida　as　the　skillful　means，　and　the
aim　or　porpose　of　the　fulfillment　of　this　value，　i．e．，satori．　The
former　has　its　own　unique　raison　d’2tre　as　distinct　from　and
prior　to　enlightenment　as　a　human　experience　although　the
latter　alone，　we　must　acknowledge，　is　capable　of　effectuating　in
the　heart　of　the　enlightened　compassion　for　the　unenlightened．
In　my　own　language，　what　is　at　issue　here　is　the　truth　that
there　is　in　the　universe　the　supreme　embodiment　of　the　intended
instrumental　value　in　the　sense　of　the“Great　Vow　of　salvation
of　all　the　sentient　beings，”　as　this　constitutes　the　prt’ncゆle　o∫
loya”y　cα1”n9／brth　worshゆノンom　sentient　beings，　Amida－Buddha．
However，　it　is　a　pity　that　Hisamatsu　simply　wants　to　explain
the　figure　of　a　Buddha　as　Other－namely，　Amida－in　terms　of
the　theonomous　projection　of　the　compassionate　structure　of
existence　peculiar　to　the　only　true　Buddha，　the　awakened
human　person．15
　　　　　1n　short，　Hisamatsu’sself－styled　Zen　atheism　betrays　its
limitations　in　the　treatment　of　the　intended　instrumental　value
of　human　nature．　On　the　contrary，　it　is　Hartshorne　who
provides　a　theistic　basis　for　this　value．　For　him，　the　intrinsic
value　of　experiences　is　by　definition　aesthetic　value．　In　contrast，
ethical　value，　goodness，　is　not　the　value　of　experiences　themselves，
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but　rather　the　intended　instrumental　value　of　acting　insofar　as
the　actor　acts　so　as　to　increase　the　intrinsic　value　of　future
experiences，　particularly　those　of　others（CSPM，308）．Thus　far
Hartshorne　shares　the　same　view　as　Hisamatsu’s．　However，　he
differs　from　Hisamatsu　in　that　he　holds：
Whereas　the　Buddhist　tries　to　will　directly　the　good　of
al1，　the　theist　wills　above　all　the　good　of　the　Eminent
One　by　whom　all　are　cherished，　So　the　theist，　too，　wills
the　good　of　all，　but　in　such　fashion　that　the　whole　of
reality，　an　ever－growing　unity，　is　taken　as　both　inclusive
object　and　inclusive　subject　of　love．（“TAWT”，411）
C．　Human　Nat％re　in　Its　Pragmatic　Value
　　　　　In　the　preceding　two　sub－sections，　I　have　elucidated　two
things：（1）As　far　as　the　intrinsic　value　of　human　nature　is
concerned，　Hisamatsu　is　right　in　clarifying　that　its　properly
metaphysical　source　lies　in　the　Formless　Self　or　the　Dharmα一
kaya，　which　includes　in　itself　the　religious　ultimate，　God　or
Amida；and（2）as　far　as　the　intended　instrumental　value　of
human　nature　is　concerned，　although　Hisamatsu　has　rightly
perceived　that　this　value　in　the　form　of　compassion　has　its　aim
in　enriching　the　intrinsic　value　of　experiencing，　satori，　he　fails
to　acknowledge　the　religious　source　of　this　value，　i．e．，Amida
or　God．　As　a　result，　his　Zen　atheism　forms　a　direct　contrary，
in　the　matter　of　the　ultimates，　to　Hartshorne’sneo－classical
theism，　a　view　that　the　concrete　nature　of　God　is　the　all－inclusive
reality．　That　is　to　say，　Hisamatsu’sall－encompassing　notion　of
the　Self　is　antagonistic　to　Hartshorne’snotion　of　the　Eminent
One　as　Love．　Here　we　have　an　opposition　between　transpersonal
Zen　atheism　and　eminently　personal　panentheism．
　　　　　However，　it　is　interesting　to　notice　that　Hisamatsu　and
Hartshorne　share　a　common　view　that　the　experience　here－now
（e．g．，satOn°）entails　compassion．　Hartshome　refers，　for　example　，
to　the　case　of　good　will，　which　is“twice　good：it　enriches
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one’唐盾翌氏@present　experience　and　in　its　consequence　tends　to
enrich　future　experiences，　not　necessarily　one’sown”（CSPM，
308）．However，　it　is　still　true　that　this　common　view　cannot
resolve　the　above　philosophical　antagonism．　For　in　order　to
resolve　it，　we　have　to　probe　into　the　true　state　of　affairs　as
regards　how　the　experience　here－now（i。e．，self－benefit）corresponds
at　the　present　mo〃zent　to　its　future　consequences　（i．e．，　benefiting
others）　especia〃ツin　accordance　zるe’th〃ze　u〃i〃zate　soz〃cθs　oアboth　o∫
them．
　　　　　In　this　regard，　I　would　contend　as　follows．　In　my　perception，
aimlessness　and　aim　co－constitute　the　experience　here－now．
Ontologically，　aimlessness　is　undergirded　by　the　metaphysical
potency，　the　Formless　Self　and　aim　is　enabled　by　the　religious
ultimate，　God　or　Amida－Buddha．　What　is　noteworthy　here　is
the　fact　that　God　or　Amida　means　what　Whitehead　designates　as
“the　primordial　nature　of　God”160r　what　Katsumi　Takizawa
conceives　as“the　Proto－factum　Immanuel”（i．e．，the　primordial
unity　of　God　and　humanity），17　namely，　the　agent　who　initiates
aims　in　the　world．　This　nature　of　God，　curiously　enough，　is
untouched　by　Hisamatsu　and　Hartshorne　in　their　discussion　of
compassion　or　love．　For　Hisamatsu，　this　nature　of　God　does　not
exist；hence，　he　holds　Zenα一theism．　For　Hartshorne，　it　can
only　be　the　abstract　aspect　of　the　concrete　nature　of　God，　who
is　affected　by　and　receives　all　the　worldly　actualities；hence，　he
professes　panentheism，
　　　　　　If　aim　and　aimlessness，　as　I　hold，　co－constitute　the
experience　here－now，　then　they　are　at　the　same　time　thereby
manifesting　a　deeper　truth　that　the　Formless　Self　and　the
primordial　nature　of　God　corconstitute　the　realm　of　the　ultimates．
To　be　sure，　the　former　ultimate，　insofar　as　the　intrinsic　value
of　experiencing　is　concemed，　includes　in　itself　the　latter　ultimate；
in　Buddhist　terms，　they　are　therefore　both　called　Dharmakaya
－the　former　perperly　as　such　and　the　latter　in　the　capacity　of
“upαya”（expedient）．　But　when　it　comes　to　discussing　the
intended　instrumental　value　of　experiencing，　a　converse　expression
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is　possible：it　is　God　who　supremely　includes　or　embodies　in
Godself　the　Formless　Self　and　thus　primordially　characterizes　it．
　　　　　It　is　precisely　from　this　perspective　that　we　proceed　to
consider　our　third　subject－matter　in　this　section，　the　pragmatic
value　of　human　nature　in　the　thought　of　Hisamatsu．　Hisamatsu
conceives　of　what　he　terms“1ength”as“forming　history　on　the
basis　of　the　two　other　dimensions　of　man’sbeing”；for　him
“length”issues　from“the　first　and　the　second　perspective，
depth　and　width”（“UCR”，1，13）．　From　his　viewpoint　of　the
self，　the　self　once　reaches　to　its　depth，　from　out　of　which　it
moves　in　width　or　extention　in　such　a　manner　that　it　covers
the　whole　humankind　which　forms　history；thus，　and　only
thus，　the　self　obtains　length（“UCR”，1，13）．　In　other　words，
1ength，　for　Hisamatsu，　means“living　the　life　of　history　while
transcending　history”（“UCR”，1，13）．
　　　　　1．The　Lt’mble∠4sl）eCt　Of　Phragmatic　Value　It　is　quite　noteworthy
that　Hisamatsu　emphasizes　freedom　in　the　midst　of　our　living
the　life　of　history．　He　prizes　the’act　of　living　the　life　of　history
insofar　as　it　is　free　and　spontaneous，　in　the　sense　that　it　never
becomes　a　dead　past　or　the　object　of　clinging．　The　pragmatic
value　of　human　nature　as　it　expresses　itself　as　history，　therefore　，
should　all　the　time　be“livable”anew，　I　assume，　for　Hisamatsu．
It　is　in　this　sense　that　he　writes；
．．．it　is　only　when　one　is　free－even　while　constantly
forming　history－not　only　from　what　has　been　formed　but
also　even　from　the　work　of　formation　itself　that　we　can
speak　of　forming　history　while　transcending　history．
（“UCR”，1，13）
　　　　　　The“livable”aspect　of　the　human　pragmatic　value，
embodied　as　history，　is，　in　this　sense，　religious．“Religion　must
of　necessity　have　the　meaning　of　transcending　history”（ibid．）．
For　Hisamatsu　there　are　two　interpretations　of　transcendence　in
religion．　One　is　the　view　that　religious　time　of　a　completely
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different　order　from　historical　time　intersects　the　latter．　According
to　this　view　the　intersection　itself　is　actual　time　as　the　present
of　religious　time．　Then　the　part　before　it　crosses　the　present　is
considered　the　past　and　the　part　after　the　crossing　is　regarded
as　the　future．　Hisamatsu　finds　a　concrete　embodiment　of　this
view　in　the　Buddhists’so－called“three　lives”as　non－identical
with　the　past，　present，　future　of　historical　time．　The“three
lives”are　rather　the　time　originating　from　somewhere　completely
beyond　history　and　entering　this　human　world　of　history，
which　after　entering，　finishes　and　leaves　the　actual　historical
time（“UCR”，1，14）．　It　is　his　contention　in　this　conjunction
that　such　an　understanding　of　time　is　a　necessary　result　of　the
idea　that　a　Buddhaland　or　a　Pure　Land　cannot　be　sought　within
this　actual，　historical　world　of　man（ibld．）．
　　　　　When　people　consider　man’soriginally　being　a　Buddha　on
the　basis　of　such　religious　time－一一rHisamatsu　proceeds　to　assumorthey
may　naturally　think　of　the　original　Buddhahood　in　the　previous
life；on　the　other　hand，　they　may　naturally　think　of　attaining
rebirth　in　the　Pure　Land　as　the　matter　of　a　future　life　in
religious　time．　In　short，　this　view　of　history　in　terms　of　religious
time　is　actually　apart　from　what　we　nowadays　call　world　history．
Hisamatsu　even　regards　it　as　a　mere　postulate　or　a　rationally
deduced　conclusion“by　analogy　with　the　causal　relationships
which　are　established　in　historical　time”（伽4．）．
　　　　　It　is　precisely　in　oPPosition　to　this　view　of　religious　time
as　transcendence　of　history　that　Hisamatsu　holds　a　different
view，　the　view　that　historical　time　is　established　with　religious
time　as　its　fundamental　subject”（“UCR”，1，14）．　What　he
means　by　this　is　the　fact　that　only　with　Formless　Self，　or　Self
without　form，　as　its　basis　and　fundamental　subject　historical
time　is　established．　In　my　own　language，　this　means　that
insofar　as　one　views　that　the　intrinsic　value　of　human　nature
（i．e．，Formless　Self）is“livable”here　at　the　present　moment　as
apragmatic　value，　one　can　transcend　history　while　never
isolated　from　it．　Hisamatsu’snotion　of　the　length－dimension
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thus　comes　to　mean　a　Supra－historical　formation　of　history．
　　　　　2．Hisumatsu　’　s　Zen　Atheism　and　Hartshome’s　Neo－clasSt’cal
　　　　　　　　Theism
　　　　　When　Hisamatsu，　from　the　above　perspective，　criticizes
heteronomous　or　theonomous　view　of　time　for　never　coinciding
with　historical　time，　isolated　and　being　an　escape　from　the
actualities　of　life，　his　critique　is　directed　toward　Pure　Land
Buddhism　and　Christian　theism　alike．　But　is　his　critique　truly
adequate？Another　of　our　authors，　Charles　Hartshorne，　would
say　no，　although　he，　too，　criticizes　traditional　theism　insofar　as
it　includes　in　itself　mo　element（s）of　naturalism．
　　　　　　As　has　already　been　seen，　Hartshorne　finds　an　intrinsic
value　in　any　and　every　actuality，　including　humanity．　Therefore，
for　him　the　idea　of　the　God　of　traditional　supernaturalism　is
questionable　because　it　is　antagonistic　or　destructive　to　that
value　in　creation．　Yet，　he　differs　also　from　traditional　naturalism，
especially　pantheism，　which　amounts　to　the　view　that“deity　is
the　all　of　relative　or　interdependent　items，　with　nothing　wholly
independent　or　in　any　clear　sense　nonrelative．”18　Thus　he　takes
the　neo－classical　stance，“panentheism”；it　is　the　view　that　deity
is　in　some　real　aspect“distinguishable　from　and　independent　of
any　and　all　relative　items，　and　yet，　taken　as　an　actual　whole，
includes　all　relative　items”（iin’d．）．From　this　standpoint，　Hisamatsu’s
naturalistic　atheism　is　a　dubious　attempt，
　　　　　　However，　Hisamatsu’sZen　atheism　is　not　the　kind　of
atheism　which　Hartshorne　designates　in　these　terms：“There　is
no　being　in　any　respect　absolutely　pe㎡ect；all　beings　are　in　all
respects　surpassable　by　something　conceivable　，　perhaps　by
others　or　perhaps　by　themselves　in　another　state．”19　Rather，　it
is，　like　H．　N．　Wieman’sidea　of　God　as　the“creative　event，”
indicative　of　the　producer，　or　the　produ，ction　or　emergence，　or
the　manner　of　production　or　emergence　of“mexpected，　unpredictable
good．”20　Hisamatsu’sZen　philosophy　of“Formless　Self”or
Ganz－Selbst2i　would　not　even　contradict　the　positivist　William　R．
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Dennes’agreement　with　John　Dewey　as　regards　theism，　which
Hartshorne，　too，　affirms，　that　the　term“God”cannot　be　given
meaning　save　as　designating“some　experienceable加㏄6ss6s－such
as　the‘multitude　of　facts　and　forces　which　we　brought　together
simply　with　respect　to　their　coincidence　in　producing　one
undesigned　effect－the　furtherance　of　good　in　human　life’”
（PSG，491）．　What　I　am　intending　to　say　by　this　is　that　Hisamatsu’　s
atheism　is　a　religt°ous　atheism．
　　　　　However，　one　of　the　major　differences　between　Hartshome
and　Hisamatsu　lies　in　the　fact　that　Hartshorne　perceives　the
emergence　of　value　as　due　to　man’sco－working　with　God
rather　than　as　literally　God’sworking　or　man’sworking（PSG，
396），whereas　Hisamatsu　conceives　of　it　as　preeminently　Fomless
Self’sworking．　Here　is　the　reason　for　the　former　to　be　a
naturalistic　theist　and　for　the　latter　to　be　a　religious　atheist．
But　both　of　them　deny　traditional　supernaturalistic　theism　and
break　through　humanistic　naturalism　or　modern　autonomous
humanism．
　　　　　We　have　been　surveying　in　this　sub－section　Hisamatsu’　s
Zen　atheistic　vision　of　human　nature　in　its　intrinsic，　intended
instrumenta1，　and　pragmatic　values．　For　the　purpose　of　elucidating
accurately　the　contents　of　his　thought　we　adopted　a　comparative
method，　namely，　the　comparative　articulation　of　his　Zen　atheism
by　contrast　with　Hartshome’sneσ一classical　theism　or　panentheism．
　　　　　　Thus　far　it　has　turned　out　that　his　thought　is　quite
congenial　to　Hartshome’sexcept　for　the　last　point　of　comparison，
i．e．，the　pragmatic　value　of　human　nature．　Both　of　them　affirm
the　co－constitution　of　human　nature　by　intrinsic　and　intended
instrumental　values．　Neither　of　them　is　thematica〃y　concerned
with　the　ultimate　religious“source”（arche）of　the　intended
instrumental　value　of　human　nature　or　Goodness：Hisamatsu　in
principle　denies　it　and　Hartshorne　argues　that　it　is　the　abstract
nature　of　God　included　in　the　concrete　nature　of　God　or　the
total　God　here－now．　By　contrast，　the　unique　significance　of
that　source，　in　my　view，　is〃励磁cα〃．y　clarified　by　Whitehead’s
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doctrine　of　the“primordial　nature　of　God”and　by　Katsumi
Takizawa’sphilosophy　of　the“Proto－factum　Immanuel”（i．e．，the
Logos）．
　　　　　At　any　rate，　it　is　now　to　be　recognized　that　both　Hisamatsu
and　Hartshome　attempt　to　solve　the　problem　of　how　self－benefit
and　benefiting　others　are　compatible　in　redemption－the　problem
with　which　we　started　this　section－in　terms　of　their　respective
dealings　with　the　synthesis　of　intrinsic　and　intended　instrumental
values　in　human　nature．　Since　Hisamatsu　sees　that　the　intrinsic
value　of　human　nature　is　nothing　other　than　the　presence
here－now　of　Formless　Self　necessarily　resulting　in　compassion，
his　solution　of　the　synthesis　is　dependent　upon　the　intrinsic
value．　This　is　commensurate　with　his　assertion　of　a－theism．　By
contrast，　although　Hartshorne，　too，　emphasizes　the　primary
importance　of　the　intrinsic　value　in　human　nature（and　in
creation　in　general），　he　takes　neo－classical　theistic　position　as
regards　the　solution　of　the　synthesis：Namely，　for　him　the
intrinsic　and　intended　instrumental　values　of　human　nature　are
both　included　in　the　total，　concrete　deity　who　absorbs　and
apPropriates　both　of　these．22
　　　　　　Their　different　solutions　to　the　synthesis　of　the　two
values　are　particularly　evident　in　their　respective　discussions　of
the　pragmatic　value　of　human　nature　inasmuch　as　this　value
can　only　occur　in　response　to　the　synthetic　actuality　of　the
other　two　values．　The　pragmatic　value　of　human　nature　is　the
practical　and　responsible　affirmation　of　this　synthesis．　Now，　as
we　have　shown　previously，　Hisamatsu’sview　of　the　pragmatic
value　satisfies　its“livable”aspect，　commensurate　with　his
solution　to　the　synthesis　of　the　intrinsic　and　intended　instrumental
values．　What　about　Hartshorne’scase，　then？He　satisfies，　it
seems　to　me，　not　only　the“1ivable”aspect　but　also　the“rationally
defensible”aspect　of　the　pragmatic　value，　commensurate　with
his　doctrine　of　panentheism．　This　has　to　be　shown，　however，
in　the　next　section，
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111．Hartshorne’sTheory　of　Human　Nature
　　　　　The　method　of　study　which　we　adopt　in　this　work　is
that　of　comparative　articulation．　If　we　want　to　know　some
thinker’ssystem　of　thought　in　its　uniqueness，　we　can　study　it
both　intensively　and　extensively－that　is，　from　within　and　by
comparison　with　some　other　system（s）of　thought．　An　intensive
study　can　be　lured　and　promoted　by　an　extensive　study，　but
not　necessarily　vice　versa．　A　quite　detailed，　elaboraste　study　of
athought，　although　there　is　no　denying　that　it　is　important
and　necessary，　sometimes　fails　to　refer　extensively　to　other
thought（s）of　a　similar　kind．　Thus　it　ends　up　with　a　parochial
and　self－righteous　attempt；it　tends　to　lack，　I　might　say，
friendship　of　scholarship．　Accordingly，　the　method　of　comparative
articulation　might　be　an　appropriate　method　of　studying　thoughts
especially　in　a　pluralistic　world　in　which　we　find　ourselves
today．
　　　　　In　the　preceding　section，　we　studied　some　of　the　major
traits　of　Hisamatsu’sZen　atheism　as　regards　human　nature　in
its　intrinsic，　intended　instrumental，　and　pragmatic　values．　We
applied　the　method　of　comparative　articulation　to　the　study　of
Hisamatsu’sthought；that　is，　we　articulated　his　Zen　anthropology，
if　necessary，　by　comparison　with　Hartshome’sthought　conceming
the　subject　matter　in　question，　the　threefold　value　system　of
humanity．　For　the　study　of　Hisamatsu’sZen　anthropology　our
use　of　Hartshorne’sthought　was　subsidiary；the　former　was
focal　in　Section　II．　Now，　in　this　section，　the　method　is　the
reverse：clarification　of　Hartshorne’　s　theory　of　human　nature　is
focal　and　Hisamatsu’sthought　subsidiary　or　instrumental．　Since
we　already　discussed　in　the　preceding　section　the　intrinsic　and
intended　instrumental　values　to　a　considerable　extent　in　the
manner　of　articulating　the　similarities　between　our　two　authors，
we　do　not　want　to　repeat　the　same　discussion　in　this　section．
We　rather　want　to　explore　the　difference　between　them　as
regards　especially　the　pragmatic　value　of　human　nature，　the
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third　point　we　discussed　in　the　preceding　section．
A．　Hu〃zan　Natt〃re　in　Its、Pragmatic　Value
　　　　　Hartshorne　recognizes，　as　does　Hisamatsu，　a　twofold　task
of　present－day　philosophy　of　religion（neo－classical　theism，　in
his　terms）：the　break－through　of　traditional　supernaturalistic
theism（heteronomous　theonomy　of　the　medieval　type，　in
Hisamatsu’scase）and　of　humanistic　naturalism（humanistic
autonomy，　in　Hisamatsu’scase）．　Both　of　them　are　keenly
aware　of　the　post－modern　responsibility　of　philosophy　of　religion．
For　both　of　them　not　only　medieval　ages　but　also　modern　times
have　totally　reliquished　their　own　validity　for　the　capacity　of
creating　adequate　metaphysics，　a　metaphysics　which　includes　in
itself　philosophical　cosmology　and　religious　thinking　in　a　synthetic
manner．　Hence，　they　have　both　been　endeavoring　vigorously
until　today　to　promote　their　respective　philosophical　movements，
process　philosophy　and　F．A．S．（i．e．，Formless　Self／All
Mankind／Super－historical　History）．（Hisamatsu，　however，
passed　away　at　the　age　of　90　in　1980；Hartshorne　is　still　active
in　his　late　90’s．）
　　　　　It　is　conspicuous　that　their　respective　philosophical　careers，
owing　their　impetus　to　the　thoughts　of　their　respective　mentors，
Kitaro　Nishida　and　Alfred　North　Whitehead，　finally　culminate　in
the　emphasis　upon　the　radical　humanization　of　metaphysics　and
thus　upon　the　importance　of　the　pragmatic　value　of　human
nature，　Praxis．　As　mentioned　before，　Hartshorne　accounts　for
the“rationally　defensible”aspect　as　well　as　for　the“livable”
aspect－the　one　Hisamatsu　articulates　in　a　peculiarly　Zen　philosophic
manner－of　the　pragmatic　value　of　human　nature．　But　how？
　　　　　1．The　Rati（ma〃ツDefensible　AsPect　o∫〃re　Pragmatic　Value
　　　　　Hartshome　shares　with　Hisamatsu　a　view　of　the　pragmatic
value　of　human　nature　as“livable．”In　his　case，　this　view　is
related　to　the　influence　of　Peirce’sand　James’pragmatism　upon
his　thought；in　him　American　pragmatism　and　Whiteheadian
process　thought　are　unified　magnificently．　For　instance，　he
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holds　the　opinion　concerning　meaning，　belief，　and　action　to
this　effect：“Ideas　are　significant　only　if　they　can　or　could　be
believed”（CSPM，80）．　Further，　he　states　that“there　is　no
adequate　test　of　the　genuineness　of　belief　other　than　this：can
（and　in　suitable　circumstances　would）the　belief　be　acted　upon
or　in　some　sense　lived　by？”（伽4．）．
　　　　　　This　element　of　pragmatism　in　his　thought　Hartshorne
calls“a　kind　of　existentialism”（CSPM，　xvi）．For　him　ideas
must　be　expressible　in　living　and　behavior　or　they　are　merely
verbal．　In　line　with　Peirce，　James，　and　Dewey　Hartshorne
affirms　that“belief　can　be　livable　without　being　true”（CSPM，
80）．Belief，　in　this　case，　implies　one　concerning　the　truth　of
life．
　　　　　Thus　far　Hartshorne　seems　to　be　considerably　in　line　with
the　Zen　existentialism　of　Hisamatsu；for　Hisamatsu，　since　this
phenomenal　existence（“my　life”）is　nothing　other　than　the
expression　of　the　true，　Formless　Self，　it　is　itself　what　Lin－chi23
calls　the“Independent　Man　of　bodhi”or　the“True－man”；the
true　Self　should　be　livable　at　present　in　the　world　of　samsara　as
this　human　Self（“Zen”，27）．Thus　Hartshorne’swords，“．．．if
they［beliefs］　are　in　no　sense　livable　then　they　cannot　be　true，
for　they　have　no　definite　meaning”（CSPM，80），　would　fit　in，
in　this　particular　connection，　with　Hisamatsu’sclaim　that　one
of　the　most　basic　Zen　expressions，“Not　relying　on　words，”is
to　be　taken　to　mean“prior　to　words，”in　the　sense　of　not
depending　on　the　sutra　expressions　but　of　immediately　actualizing
here－now　Buddha－Nature　or“one’sOriginal－Face”（“Zen”，
23－4）．
　　　　　Yet，　Hartshorne　differs　from　Hisamatsu　in　that　he　grasps
the　livable　aspect　of　pragmatic　value　only　within　the　dipolarity
of　this　aspect　and　the　rationally　defensible　aspect，　which　Hisamatsu，
however，　rather　neglects　characteristically，　as　has　been　critically
pointed　out　by　Katsumi　Takizawa．　Takizawa’scriticism　was
concerned　with　Hisamatsu’sview　of　a　comtinuit．y－in－discontinuity
between　the“samsara－1ike”（JPn．，sぬo〃θ々のor　inauthentic　self
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and　the“nirvana－like”（JPn．，metsudoteki）or　Authentic　or
Formless　Self　as　not　really　distinguishing　between　a　primary
continuity　（i．e．，the　absolute　fact　of　unity－in－distinction　in　the
depths　of　every　human　existence　of　the　eternal，　universal
Buddhahood　and　the　spacio－temporal　sentient　beings）and　a
secondary　continuity（i．e．，the　emergence　of　a　true　man　as　the
enlightened）that　can　arise　only　based　upon　the　primary　one．24
The　problem　is　whether　one　really　recognizes　rationally　what
one　has　already　been　experiencing　as　livable　in　one’sown　life．
　　　　　Now，　according　to　Hartshome，　the　problem　of　metaphysics
is　to　find　or　create　a　view　of　first　principles　that　covers　both
aspects，　livable　and　rationally　defensible（CSPM，　xvi）．　In　view
of　this　important　rational　character　of　Hartshorne’smetaphysics
let　me　articulate　his　thought　in　comparison　with　some　other
American　philosophers，　such　as　William　James，　Charles　S．
Peirce，　and　John　Dewey，　in　what　follows．　Here　our　East－West
inter－religious　comparative　articulation　of　Hartshorne’sthought
with　Hisamatsu’sas　its　major　dialogue　partner　necessarily　gives
rise　to　a　new，　intra－Western　discussion　of　the　pragmatic　value
of　human　nature．This　is　important　and　understandable　even
for　us　Easterners　because　it　has　turned　out　that　the　problem　of
metaphysical　axiology　cannot　be　exhausted　by　our　comparative
studies　of　Hartshorne’sand　Hisamatsu’sviews　of　human　nature
in　its　intrinsic，　intended　instrumenta1，　and　pragmatic　values．
However，　as　shall　be　shown，　this　intra－Western　discussion
finally　enriches　our　East－West　inter－religious　comparative　articulation，
paradoxically　enough．
　　　　　　For　Hartshorne　the　pragmatic　value　of　human　nature，
which　must　be　livable　at　the　present　moment，　must　at　the　same
time　be　experimentally　verified　in　the　future．　In　this　sense
Hartshorne’sneo－classical　metaphysics　is　basically　in　accord
．with　William　James’pragmatism，　the　insistence　that　true　ideas
are　those　that　we　can　assimilate，　validate，　corroborate　and
verify－that　is，　those　that　become　instruments，　not　answers　to
enigmas　upon　which　we　can　lie　back．25　However，　Hartshorne
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goes　deeper　than　James　in　his　understanding　of　verifiability　or
instrumentality　of　ideas　about　the　universe，　including　especially
human　natUre．　He　tries　to　explicate　the　fntl　meaning　of　Whitehead’　s
dictum　，　which　he　esteems（see　CSMP，　xvi），　that“rationalism
is　the　search　for　the　coherence　of　the　presupPositions　of　civilized
living．”We　can　say，　in　this　regard，　that　Hartshorne　shares
Charles　Sanders　Peirce’spragmaticism，　though　with　a　new
emphasis　upon　its　theistic　application　or　amplification，　i．e．，　the
thesis　that
does　not［like　James’pragmatism］make　the　summum
bonztm　to　consist　in　action，　but　makes　it　to　consist　in　that
process　of　evolution　whereby　the　existent　comes　more　and
more　to　embody　these　generals　which　were　just　now　said
to　be　destined，　which　is　what　we　strive　to　express　in
calling　them　reasonable，as
　　　　　　Hartshorne　adds　a　new　theistic　meaning　to　Peirce’s
pragmaticism　of　this　kind　by　applying　his　pragmaticistic　categories，
though　Peirce　largely　refused　to　do　so，　to　God（CSPM，　xvi）．
This　is　because　he　believes　the　pragmatic　value　of　human
nature　is　rationally　defensible　only　and　finally　in　terms　of
neo－classical　theism．　In　short，　Peirce　raised　the　question　of　the
source　of　pragmatic　value　by　coining　the　term“pragmaticism”in
opposition　to　James’popularization　of　his　thought　as“pragmatism，”
Hartshorne　attempts　to　solve　this　question　through　and　through
theistically．
　　　　　2．Continuity　Let　us　then　examine　Hartshome’ssolution　to
the　question　of　the　source　of　the　pragmatic　value　of　human
nature　in　his　conception　of‘‘continuity”；his　critique　of　John
Dewey’spragmatism　provides　a　useful　case　in　this　matter．
Hartshorne　is　fully　aware　of　the　fact　that　continuity　is　one　of．
the“subtlest”problems　which　event　pluralism　like　pragmatism
must　face，　because　people　are　prone　to　regard　the　apparent
continuity　of　process　as　its“lack　of　distinct　units”（CSPM，
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192）．Dewey，　Bergson，　Peirce，　all　three　careful　thinkers　much
interested　in　the　analysis　of　experience　as　such，　he　critically
assumes，　found　no　definite　discreteness　in　the　becoming　of
human　experience（CSPM，192）．
　　　　　　Dewey，　for　instance，　regards　the　life　of　humanity　as
continuous　in　such　a　sense　that“what　one　person　and　one
group　accomplish　becomes　the　standing　ground　and　starting
point　of　those　who　succeed　them．”27　Such　a　continuous　nature
of　human　experience，　in　Dewey’sview，　is　consistent　with　a
natural　scientific　truth　called　‘‘a　chain　of　cause　and　effects”　in
what　happens　with　inanimate　things．“To　live　signifies，”says
Dewey，“that　a　connected　continuity　of　acts　is　effected　in　which
preceding　ones　prepare　the　conditions　under　which　later　ones
　　　　　　”280ccur．
　　　　　For　Dewey，　therefore，　the　continuity　of　the　life　process　is
solely　ensured　by　human　acts　themselves，　not　by　anything
beyond　them．　His　hatred　of　traditional　supernaturalism　proceeds
from　here．　It　is　a　pity　for　him　that　something　in　human　nature，
if　exposed　to　danger，　breeds　an　overpowering　love　of　security，
love　for　certainty，　translated　into　a　desire　not　to　be　disturbed
and　unsettled，　thus　leading　to“dogmatism，　to　intolerance　and
fanaticism　on　one　side　and　sloth　on　the　other”（QC，228）．That
so辮召砺πg　he　regards　as　the　isolation　of　the　human　self，　or　the
isolated　self，　from“continuity　with　the　natural　world”（QC，
23）．The　isolated　self，　magnifying　itself　as　traditional　supematuralism，
is　by　nature　hostile　to　what　occurs　in　experimental　inquiry，
that　is，　to　what　isαc’勿θ砂c（mtinuoz｛s　in　human　nature　with　the
nature　outside，　including　the　self’spast　experiences（QC，229）．
　　　　　　This　view　of　continuity　by　Dewey　is　in　a　sense　naive
from　the　Hartshomean　perspective　because　it　fails　to　distinguish，
in　what　is　actively　continuous　in　human　nature，　between　the
discrete　and　the　continuous．　If　acts　of　becoming　are，　as　Hartshorne
insists　with　Whitehead，　atomic　and　discrete，　they　cannot　be
continuous　by　themselves　with　the　nature　outside．　There　must
be　something　else　enabling　them　to　be　so．　What　is　that，　then？
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Dewey　can　never　answer　this　question．
　　　　　　Hartshorne，　on　the　contrary，　finds　an　answer　to　the
question　in　the　fact　that　the“incoming　officer　of　an　organization
and　previous　officers　both　represent　the　same　on－going　society”
（CSPM，198）．　By　society　Hartshorne　means　what　Whitehead
terms　an“enduring　individual．”Then，　he　writes：
Each　such　self　inherits　purposes　from　its　predecessors，
and　the　more　it　can　accept　and　execute　these　purposes，
the　richer　and　more　harmonious　will　be　its　own　content．
But　more　than　that．　In　my　view　a　rational　self，　no　matter
how　momentary，　cannot　be　satisfied　with　less　than　a
rational　aim，　and　no　aim　short　of　some　universal　long－run
good　is　fullY　rational．（CSPM，198）
　　　　　It　is　noteworthy　in　this　passage　that　Hartshome　is　concerned
with　purposes　or　aims　but　not　acts，1ike　Dewey，　in　accounting
for　the　problem　of　continuity．　The　passage　speaks　of　two
stages：the　stage　of　appropriating　purposes　from　the　past　and
the　stage　of　aiming　at　some　universal　long－run　good．　The
former　stage，　in　my　view，　is　inclusive　of　Dewey’sinsistence
upon　a“chain　of　cause　and　effects”；in　this　sense　Hartshorne，
too，　affirms　that　each　momentary　actuality　necessarily　inherits
causally　from　its　past，　and　that　this　inheritance　necessitates　that
acertain　class　of　possible　successors　to　that　past　should　not
remain　empty（that　is，　they　are　in　a“cumulative”process）
（CSPM，202）．However，　the　real　problem　of　continuity　does
not　lie　herein．　Rather，　it　lies　in　the　latter　stage，　which　Hartshome
explicates　as　follows：
＿each　new　concrete　self　faces　the　task，　not　merely　of
prolonging　a　chain　of　causal　necessities，　or　of　continuing
to　express　an　antecedent　character　which，　with　circumstances，
uniquely　determines　concrete　actions，　but　of　freely　creating
aslightly　new　character，　and　thus　establishing　a　new　set
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of　causal　possibilities　and　probabilities．（CSPM，202）
　　　　　The　real　problem　of　continuity　should，　then，　be　explored
with　a　question　like　this：How　can　we　discern　continuity　with
respect　to　free　actions？Put　in　another　way：What　guarantees
the　continuity　of　one’sfree　actions　when　and　in　that　they　are
spontaneous　and　independent　of　the　nature　outside　，　including
one，　s　OWn　paSt　eXperienCeS？
　　　　　　This　really　is　a　difficult　problem．　For　we　would　easily
confuse　a　quasi－solution　to　it　with　a　real　one．　As　Hartshorne
clearly　discerns，　no　process　directly　exhibited　in　human　experiences
seems　to　come　in　clearly　discrete　units（CSPM，192）；that　is，　a
real　discreteness　is　only　vaguely　or　apProximately　given（CSPM，
192）．As　a　result，　we　would　assume　that　this　vague　presence　of
discreetness　in　human　experiences　is　identical　with　continuity．
Therefore，　we　need　to　have，　in　this　matter，　a　metaphysica1，
rather　than　merely　empirical，　intuition，　like　the　one　that
Hartshorne　shows　when　he　says：“．．．continuity　belongs　with
the　abstract，　indefinite，　possible，　infinite，　not　with　the　concrete，
definite，　actual，　finite．”This　metaphysical　truth，　in　his　view，
was　missed　by　Bergson，　Peirce，　and　Dewey，　but　seen　by　James
and　Whitehead（anticipated　by　Buddhists　and　some　Islamic
thinkers）（CSPM，195）．
　　　　　Viewed　from　the　perspective　of　this　metaphysical　truth，
the　problem　of　continuity　is　necessarily　to　be　conceptually
reversed：one　need　not　be　worried　to　ensure　the　continuity　of
one’唐??垂?窒奄?獅モ?@by　one’sown　acts　but　rather　find　oneself，　to
one’唐№窒?≠煤@surprise　and　inmost　joy，　in　what　Hartshorne　calls
the“immanence　of　God．”Now　it　is　possible，　one　comes　to
realize，　to　interpret　the　afore－mentioned　two　stages　of　human
experience　from　a　new　perspective　as　when　Hartshorne　states：
“The　universality　of　order，　and　of　creative　freedom　from　order，
are　two　expressions　of　the　immanence　of　God　whose　attributes
are　the　supreme　values　of　the　cosmic　variables”（BH，164）．
　　　　　Then，　what　is　the　metaphysical　character　of　this　immanent
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God？Hartshorne　replies：This　God　is“nature，　envisaged　as
rationally　and　concretely　as　man　can　envisage　her”（BH，163）
and　is“the　unitary　drives．。．by　virtue　of　which　the　world　is
itself　a　living　individual－in　this　case　a　deathless　（though　not
an　unchanging！）one”（BH，163）．That　is，　this　immanent　God
is　a　supremely“enduring　individual”or　a　maximal　embodiment
of“on－going　society，”who　alone　can　guarantee　the　continuity
of　human　nature／experience　in　the　midst　of　free　actions　by　any
of　us．　Thus　the　factor　of　creative　action，　real　possibility，　and
open　future，　for　Hartshome，　is　the　expression　of　the　immanence
of　God　as“a　supreme　creativity　in　the　world”（BH，162）．It　is，
therefore，　only　from　the　perspective　of　the　immanence　of　God
that　Hartshorne　wants　to　rationa〃y　defend　the　pragmatic　value　of
human　nature　as　it　appears　in　human　actions　but　is　continuously
related　to　the　nature　outside．　What　now　appears　to　be　pivotal　is
the　notion　of‘‘enduring　individual”　or　‘‘on－going　society”　as　it
is　deified　by　virtue　of　the　immanence　of　God；the　continuity　of
human　nature　through　time　is　only　guaranteed　by　that　immanence．
　　　　　　It　is　to　be　noted　at　this　juncture　that　a　similar　case　of
deification　of　the　notion　of“individua1”can　be　seen　in　Hisamatsu．
Similar　to　Hartshorne，　he　regards　the　problem　of　continuity　of
human　nature　in　the　midst　of　time　of　actions　as　the　immanent
expression　of　Something　Divine．　But　in　his　case　this　Something
Divine　does　not　mean　God　but　the　metaphysical　ultimate，　the
Formless　Self．　His　way　of　explaining　the　problem　of　continuity
is　as　follows：
The　self　of　lif←death　nature〔i。e．，human　nature〕breaking
up　and　becoming　the　Self　without　life－and－death　means
that　the　self　of　life－death　nature　becomes　awakened　to　its
original　Self　．　In　this　sense　the　Self　without　life－and－death
has　continuity　with　the　self　of　life－death　nature．（”UCR”，
1，28；italics　mine）
The　deification　procedure（or，　more　accurately，　identifiαation）
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observable　in　the　above　is　by　virtue　of　the　metaphysical　Self，
the　Formless　Self．　It　is　therefore　a　non－theistic　or　a－theistic
deification．　For　Hisamatsu，　it　necessarily　involves　a　leap　and
thus　is　not　a　flat　identity．“The　self　in　uユtimate　antinomy〔of
life－and－death〕cannot　become　the　True　Self　with　continuity．
Only　when　the　self　which　is　ultimately　antinomic　breaks　up，
does　the　Self　of　Oneness　awake　to　itself”⑳ゴ4．）．　This　solution
to　the　problem　of　continuity　of　human　nature，　to　my　mind，　is
mainly　explicative　of　the　intrinsic　value　of　human　nature　as
effected，　that　is，　the　livable　aspect　of　the　pragmatic　value　of
human　nature；it　does　not，　as　Hartshorne’snotion　of　the
immanence　of　God　does，　account　for　the　rationally　defensible
aspect　of　the　pragmatic　value．
　　　　　　This　divergence　between　the　two　authors　is　striking，
Iesulting　from　their　respective　metaphysical　orientations，　Hisamatsu’s
Zen　atheism　and　Hartshorne’sneo－classical　theism．　It　will　be
discussed　more　fully　later　on（in　Sub－section　B）．Here　suffice　it
to　say　that　the　divergence　is　of　crucial　significance　in　the
matter　of　the　inter－cultural　dialogue　between　Buddhism　and
Christianity　with　specific　focus　upon　human　nature．　Our　specific
task　in　this　sub－section　now　is　to　articulate　further　Hartshome’s
notion　of　the　immanence　of　God　as　it　relates　itself　to　two　more
subject－matters，　quality　of　feeling　and　ethical　decision．
　　　　　3．Quality　of　Feeling　As　has　been　elucidated　so　far，　what
is　metaphysically　continuous　is　not　act　but　on－going　society
constitutive　of　human　nature　and　this　society　is　absorbed　into
and　is　deified　by　the　immanence　of　God．　Then　what　is　the
distinctive　character　of　the　metaphysically　continuous　in　human
nature／experience？The　answer　Hartshome　gives　to　this　question
is：quality　of　feeling．
　　　　　　Hartshorne　criticizes　several　commentators（including
Dewey）of　the　great　panpsychist　theoretician　of“feeling－quality，”
Charles　Sanders　Peirce．　Hartshorne　says　they　have　tried　to
purify　Peirce’stheory　of　feeling－quality　from　its　psychic　aspects
（by　distinguishing　between　its“monadic”property　and　the
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special　case　when　this　quality　is　a　quality　of　feeling），only　to
ruin　Peirce’sfirst　category　altogether（BH，185）．First，　what
explains　the　existence　of　red　or　blue，　in　their　view，　is　bare
oneness，　whereas　the　whole　point　of　Peirce’sendeavor，　Hartshome
stresses，　was　to　show“how　such　feelings　are　the　basis　of
logical　unity，　not　the　reverse”@（BH，185）．　Second，　these
commentators，　in　Hartshorne’sview，　are　contradicting　Peirce’s
category　of　universal“thirdness”or　continuity　as　the　essence　of
the　universal（BH，185）．Hartshorne　affirms，　with　Peirce，　that
quality，　as　a　universal，　can　only　be　a　continuum．
　　　　　In　his　theory　of　categories　Peirce　affirms　that　experience
has　the　three　basic　aspects　of　feeling－quality，　reaction　or　con且ict，
and　meaning．　With　respect　to　those　three　categories　Hartshorne
holds　that，　since　existence　（or　experience）　is　an　integration　of
the　three　categories，　it　is　feeling　that　has　the　more　adequate
connotations（BH，185）．　Here　lies，　Hartshorne　assumes，　one
reason　for　Peirce’sbeing　a　panpsychist．　Furthermore，　there
seems　to　be　a　distinction　between　quality　and　feeling．　This，　in
Hartshorne’sview，　is　due　to　the　fact　that“feeling”suggests　the
integration　of　the　monadic　category　with　the　other　two　categories
of　reaction　and　meaning，　whereas“quality”abstracts　sharply
from　all　relations（BH，186）．
　　　　　　Seen　from　Hartshornes’spanpsychic　view，　the　word
“quality”refers　to“whatever　is　continuous　with（through
whatever　range　of　intermediaries）such　sensory　or　effective
predicates　as　red　or　sweet　or　painful　or　the　feeling－quality　of　a
human　consciousness　as　a　whole”（BH，186）．Aqualitative
genus（like　color）is　a　larger　section　of　the　continuum，　a
species（like　red）asmaller　slice　of　it．　In　any　case，　it　is　important
for　us　to　note　here　that　Hartshorne，　primarily　based　upon　his
notion　of“continuum，”intends　to　deal　with‘‘the　panpsychic
extension　of　feeling　to　all　things　in　so　far　as　they　are　qualitative”
（BH，1186）．　Panpsychism　is　the　metaphysical　solution　to　the
problem　of　continuity　for　Hartshorne．　He　has　learned　it　from
Peirce．
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　　　　　　It　is　to　be　noted，　however，　that　panpsychism　in　its
Hartshornean　version　is　distinct　from　and　goes　further　than　the
Peircean　original　in　that　it　necessarily　undergoes　a　conceptual
reversion　by　virtue　of　the　immanence　of　God．　This　time　the
immanence　is　termed　the“feeling　of　feeling．”By　the　feeling　of
feeling“God　feels　wicked　feelings　not　as　his　own　feelings　but　as
his　creatures’”（CSPM，241）．　As　Hartshorone　elaborates，　the
first　feeling　is　the“subjective　form”of　the　experience，　the
second　the“objective　form．”That　is，　both　are　feelings　but　the
second　is　the　original（and　temporally　prior），　the　first　is　a
participation　in　the　second　after　the　fact．　What　is　conspicuous
in　Hartshome’stheistic　panpsychism　is，　then，　that　he　distinguishes
between　the　creaturely　fact　that　wickedness　is　in　wrong　decisions
and　the　divine　fact　that“God　inherits　our　decisions，　as　ours，
not　as　his”（CSPM，241）．
　　　　　4．、Etim’cal　Decision　Hartshorne’ssolution　to　the　problem　of
evil　as　in　the　above　is，　I　admire，　superb．　This　superbness
implies，　however，　more　than“feeling　of　feeling．”Iwould　say
that　it　implies“feeling　of　feeling”ρ1％s　goodness．　In　my　view，
Hartshorne　connects　panpsychism　with　the　idea　of　goodness，
especially　of　the　divine　goodness，　namely，　with　neo－classical
theism．　But　how？We　can　elucidate　this　in　scrutinizing　his
critique　of　Dewey’sview　of　ethical　decision．
　　　　　For　Dewey，　as　Hartshorne　clearly　perceives，　the　basis　of
ethical　decision　is　the　total，　unique，　concrete　situation，　not
some　abstract　rule（DR，125）．　He　is　antagonistic　to　traditional
religion’semphasis　upon　salvation　of　the　personal　soul　and　also
to　the　utilitarian　insistence　upon　private　pleasure　as　the　motive
for　action．　He　instead　finds“the　real　object　of　a〃intelligent
conducts”in　the　idea　that　the　stable　and　expanding　institutions
of　all　things　make　life　worth　while　throughout　all　human
relationships（QC，31）．　He　seeks　the　motive　for　action　apart
from　Being　which　is　universal，　fixed，　and　immutable（QC，
7）－and　this　in　view　of　the　inherent　uncertainty　characteristic
of　practical　activity（QC，6）．
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　　　　　　Hartshorne，　however，　criticizes　Dewey’sposition　for
failing　to　take　into　account　the　fact　that“man　does　not　see　the
concrete　situation，　except　with　enormous　and　more　or　less
willfully　selected　blind　spots”（DR，125）．　The　implication　of
this　critique　of　Dewey　is，　I　would　assume，　metaphysical　cum
theistic．　I　mean　that　Hartshome　is　keenly　aware　of　the　impeding
factor　of　human　actions　inherent　in　human　nature，　evil．　This
factor　we　can　solve　or　break　through　only　by　the　metaphysical
cztm　theistic　means．　To　be　sure，　Dewey　is　right　in　that　he　hates
traditionalists’hypocrisy　of　pretending　to　be　devoted　to　intellectual
certainty　for　its　own　sake　although　actually　they　want　it　to
safeguard　what　they　desire　and　esteem（QC，39）．　But　he　is
mistaken　in　assuming　that　traditionalists’engagement　in　metaphysics
or　theism　necessarily　leads　to　hypocrisy．　For　their　hypocrisy　is
caused　not　because　of　metaphysics　but　because　of　their　failure
in　metaphysics　or　theism．　What　is　needed　is，　therefore，　an
authentic　metaphysics－cum－theism，　not　its　denial．　This　view　is
commensurate　with　Hartshorne’sfollowing　dictum：
There　is　no　reason　or　motive　for　pursuing　the　good　but
the　good　itself．　To　know　the　end　is　to　have　all　the　motives
there　can　be　for　seeking　to　actualize　it．　If，　then，　God　is
adequately　aware　of　all　actuality　as　actual　and　all　possibility
as　possible，　he　has　adequate　motivation　for　seeking　to
actualize　maximal　possibilities　of　future　value．　There　can
be　no　ethical　appeal　beyond　the　decision　of　the　one　who
in　his　decision　takes　account　of　all　actuality　and　possibility．
（DR，124－5）
　　　　　　This　really　is　a　metaphysical　cum　theistic　explication　of
the　rationally　defensible　aspect　of　the　pragmatic　value　of　human
nature．　The　conceptual　reversion　of　human　experience　by　virtue
of　the　immanence　of　God　is　here　effected　with　specific　focus
upon　the　notion　of　the　good．　As　a　result，　Hartshome　is　able　to
envision　a　moral　principle　that　one　needs　the　help　of　rules，
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adopted　in　moments　of　calm　and　disinterested　reflection，　to
protect　oneself　and　others　against　the　bias　of　one’sperceptions
and　inferences．　This　principle　is　in　direct　opposition　to　Dewey’s
ethical　activism　with　no　metaphysical　or　theistic　undergirding
and　is　guaranteed　by　a　deeper　principle　that　God　needs　nothing
but　his　perceptive　grasp　of　the　actual　and　potential　experiences
and　interests，　and　the　power　of　reaching　a　decision，　any　decision　，
taking　account　of　what　he　perceives（DR，125）．This　latter
principle　means　nothing　other　than　a　metaphysical－onm－theistic
definition　of“goodness，”namely　，　the　divine　goodness．
B．　Theis〃z　VerSZtS　Hu〃zam’s〃z
　　　　　　As　we　have　shown　in　the　preceding　sub－section，　the
notion　of　the　immanence　of　God　is　pivotal　in　Hartshorne’s
explication　of　the　rationally　defensible　aspect　of　the　pragmatic
value　of　human　nature．　This　notion　alone　can　guarantee　meta－
physically　cum　theistically　our　human　endeavor　of　corroborating
the　truth　of　civilized　actions．　It　alone　enables　the　intended
instrumental　value　in　our　actions　truly　instmmental　to　the　future
experiences，　not　necessarily　of　our　own．　If　God　is　willing　to　be
influenced　by　our　actions，　our　actions　will　never　fail　to　be
instrumental　to　the　future．　Even　evil　in　our　actions　will　be
absorbed　by　deity，　but　only　because　it　is　redemptively　transformed．
　　　　　　This　vision，　however，　cannot　be　accepted　at　least　by　two
groups　of　people，　traditional　supernaturalists　and　humanistic
naturalists．　The　former　group　of　people　negate　the　immanent
nature　of　God，　the　latter　the　traditional　notion　of　God　itself．　It
is　to　be　noted　here，　however，　that　humanistic　naturalists，　such
as　Dewey，　negate　traditional　supernaturalism，　just　like　Hartshome
does．　Is　there，　then，　any　point　of　contact　between　Dewey’s
humanistic　naturalism　and　Hartshorne’sneo－classical　theism？
What　precisely　is　the　place　where　they　divert　from　each　other？
　　　　　　Dewey’shumanistic　naturalism　is　a　standpoint　to　consider
the　creative　process　as　a“natural　process，”@in　the sense　that　it
endures　and　advances　with　the　life　of　humanity　to　the　extent
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that　it　can　be“both　accelerated　and　purified　through　elimination
of　that　irrelevant　element　that　culminates　in　the　idea　of　the
supernatural”（CF，50）．As　a　radical　anti－supernaturalist，
Dewey　accordingly　discloses　his　humanistic　hope　of　keeping　the
vital　factors　within　the　limit　of　the　natural　so　as　to　gain　an
incalculable　reinforcement．　This　hope　is　inseparably　connected
with　his　re－definition　of“God”as“an　active　relation　between
ideal　and　actual．”He　differentiates“the　religious”from　religions
（See　Chapter　1，“Religion　Versus　the　Religious，”of、4　Common
Faith）．　As　Harthshorne　carefully　acknowledges，　Dewey’shumanistic
naturalism　is　not，　mysteriously，　atheistic．
　　　　　This　is　internally　related　to　Dewey’sview　of　the“possibiIity
of　Praxis”（i．e．，the　total　ontological　basis　of　Praxis，　or　of　the
pragmatic　value　of　human　nature　with　both　its　livable　and
rationally　defensible　aspects）and　of　the“relationship　between
God　and　nature”（i．e．，the　problem　of　theological　cosmology）．
Hartshome，　however，　repudiates　Dewey’sview　from　his　perspective
of　neo－classical　theism．　In　what　sense　or　to　what　extent　is
Hartshorne　right　in　his　regard？This　is，　then，　our　question　to
be　pursued　in　this　final　sub－section．
　　　　　Significantly　enough，　Hartshome’srepudiation　of　Dewey’s
humanistic　naturalism　includes　in　itself　a　repudiation　of　traditional
supernaturalism，　a　collaboration　with　him．　This　is　important　for
the　over－all　intention　of　our　study，“Hartshorne　and　Hisamatsu
on　Human　Nature．”For　Hisamatsu，　too，　repudiates　modern
humanism　as　well　as　traditional　theism．　By　scrutinizing　Hartshorne’s
critique　of　Dewey　we　finally　would　like，　therefore，　to　deliver　a
conceptual　equipment　for　the　co耳nparison　of　Hartshorne’sand
Hisamtsu’smetaphysics　as　regards　the　possibility　of　praxis　and
the　relationship　between　God（or　Buddha）and　nature．
　　　　　1．The　Po∬ibility　oアPraxis　In　Chapter　Three　of　his　Beyond
Humanism，“Dewey’sPhilosophy　of　Religion，”Hartshorne　is
concemed　with　the　paradoxical　character　of　religious　consciousness，
i．e．，the　tension　which　it　involves　between　the　finite　and　the
infinite．　For　him　it　is　a　pity　that　there　is　a　natural　tendency
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for　human　beings　to　seek　to　escape　from　religion　of　this　sort．
People’sescape　from　religion　happens　in　the　manner　like　this：
They　do　this　in　two　opposite　ways：by　trying　to　escape
from　their　human　sense　of　finitude　through　mystical
illusion　of　absolute　oneness　with　God，　or　by　trying　to
obliterate　their　no　less　human　consciousness　of　the　infinite．
（BH，39）
　　　　　The　first　is　the　standpoint　of　traditional　theology，　while
the　second，　in　Hartshome’sview，　is　best　represented　by　Dewey’s
ACommon　Faith．
　　　　　Hartshorne，　however，　accepts　Dewey’scritique　of　atheism
to　the　effect　that　atheism，　like　traditional　theology，　is　lacking
in　appreciation　of　the　fact　that　without　nature　we　could　do
nothing．　He　is　also　appreciative　of　what　Dewey　calls“natural
piety，”the　piety　the　atheist　lacks．　But　for　Hartshorne　natural
piety　is　significant　only　insofar　as　it　means　pansychism．　For，
then，“there　is　a　fairly　obvious　reason　for　suspecting　that　it
also　means　a　kind　of　theism，　though　not　the　kind　Dewey　is
explicitly　opposing”（BH，41）．From　this　point　of　view，　Hartshome
even　characterizes　Dewey’sview　of　natural　piety　as　the　position
in　which“Crudely，　God　is　simply　nature　as　serviceable　to　man”
（BH，39）．
　　　　　Hartshorne’scritique　of　Dewey’shumanistic　naturalism
then　moves　on　to　the　problem　of　how　to　evaluate　the　newer
tendencies　in　science　as　favorable　to　its　recognition　of　the
“naturalness”of　purposive　action．　Both　of　them　affirm　these
tendencies．　Dewey　rightly　observes（and　Hartshorne　agrees）
that　as　long　as　the　Newtonian　science，　with　its　dogmatic
assertion　that　purposes　have　no　real　part　in　natural　process，　at
least　below　the　human　level，　was　firmly　held，　a　dichotomy
between　human　and　non－human　nature　favored　super－naturalism．
However，　the　God　of　supernaturalism　as　an　actual　individual
endowed　with　perfection　is，　for　Dewey（and　also　for　Hartshorne），
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simply　the　vicious　identification　of　the　possible　and　the　actual．
For　above　the　actualities　of　nature　there　are　the“unrealized　but
realizable　possibilities　of　nature”　calling　for　ethical　adventure　by
men　and　women．　Then　Dewey　contends（and　Hartshorne
merely　partially　agrees）that“Moral　and　religious　faith　are　not
so　much　in　what　is，　as　in　what，　through　our　action，　might　be”
（BH，41），　and　that“To　destroy　this‘might　be’character　of
the　ideal　is　to　cut　the　nerve　of　action”（BH，41）．
　　　　　　Hartshorne　explains　the　reason　why　he　does　not　fully
agree　with　Dewey’sthesis　of　the“might　be”character　of　the
ideal　in　human　praxis：
Dewey　is　a　shrewd　critic　of　the　human　lust　for　absolute
knowledge．　But　the“quest　for　certainty，”as　the　cowardly
search　for　a　life　without　risk，　is　one　thing；while　the
quest　for　assurance　that　there　is　a　minimal　significance　to
the　brave　facing　of　risk－and　all　life　when　well　lived－is
another　thing．　The　one　is　cowardice　or　madness，　as　you
choose．　The　other　is　merely　rationality，　the　intelligent
understanding　of　the　implications　of　courage．（BH，44）
That　is　to　say，　Hartshorne　fundamentally　affirms　as“what』奄刀h
the“world－embracing　love　of　Go♂（BH，44），　and　for　him　this
“what　is”can　alone　guarantee　the“intelligent　understanding　of
the　implications　of　courage．”
　　　　　　In　my　opinion，　however，　Hartshorne’srepudiation　of
Dewey　in　the　above　is　one－sided．　To　be　sure，　he　is　right　in
articulating　the　importance　of　the　rationally　defensible　aspect　of
the　pragmatic　value　of　human　nature　as　commensurate　with　the
“might　be”character　of　the　ideal－and　this　in　terms　of　a　theistic
quest　for　assurance　as　the　intelligent　understanding　of　the
implications　of　courage．　But　this　does　not　mean　that　he　has
fully　articulated　the　meaning　of　courage　as　it　occurs　here－now
when　one　plunges　into　the“might　be”character　of　the　ideal　in
human　nature．　In　other　words，　he　does　not　account　for　the
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livable　aspect　of　the　pragmatic　value　of　human　nature　or　Praxis
as　regards　its　lith‘’㎎sonrce．
　　　　　It　is　precisely　at　this　conjuncture，1　assume，　that　Hisamatsu
as　a　Zen　atheist　asserts　that　going　toward　what　is　beyond
humanity　does　not　mean　leaving　humanity　for　God　or　leaving
here　for　the　beyond　but“transforming　here　while　not　leaving
here”（“M”，74）．　For　him　it　is　in　this　sense　that　Nirvana　is
Samsara．　To　be　noteworthy，　he　in　this　regard　calls　into　question
the　theistic　view　that　only　with　respect　to　God　the　movement
“from　beyond　down　to　here”is　valid　and　contends　that　the
same　movement（e．9．，agape　or　compassion）is　discernible　in
humanity，　too．　This　is　because　it　is　intrinsic　to　every　human
being　to　be　and　to　become　a　Buddha（“M”，76）．　To　be　a
Buddha　constitutes　the　intrinsic　value　of　human　nature　and　to
become　a　Buddha　the　pragmatic　value．　The　latter　value　is　a
courageous　realization　of　the　former　value　by　any　of　us．　Since
the　intrinsic　value　is　that　of　each　one　of　us，　realization　of　this
value，　i．e．，the　pragmatic　value，　necessarily　takes　the　form　of　a
self－re　aliz　ation．　The　intrinsic　value　of　human　nature　as　Formless
Self　is　the　living　source　of　the　pragmatic　value，　Praxis，　especially
of　its　livable　aspect．
　　　　　　　　　　　　　り　　　　　Hartshome　s　quest　for　assurance　as　the　intelligent　understanding
of　the　implications　of　courage　in　terms　of　the　immanence　of
God，　of　course　，　includes　in　itself　the　intention　or　consequence
of　the　livable　aspect　of　the　pragmatic　value．　Therefore，　he
admits　himself　to　be　a　pragmaticist　or　existentialist．　Yet，　his
over－all　philosophic　stance　is　that　of　a　rationalistic　defender　of
the　pragmatic　value，　as　when　he　states：“Human　choice　may
then　make　a　difference　to　God　as　the　action　of　a　man’scells
make　a　difference　to　the　man”（BH，42）．　This　famous　doctrine
of　organic－social　analogy　by　Hartshorne　is　of　temporalistic
modality，　in　the　sense　that　God’sfuture　enjoyment　will　be
partially　contingent　upon　our　actions（BH，42）．　Within　this
context，　intelligence　in　action　（i．e．，the　very　thing　in　the
pragmatic　value　that　is　to　be　rationally　defended）is　essentially
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“the　power　to　generalize　beyond　the　mere　finite（as，　for　example，
in　mathematics），so　that　it　can　hardly　make　a　satisfactory
religion　to　conceive　of　human　ideals　as　referring　to　a　merely
finite　future”（BH，43）．
　　　　　From　this　perspective，　Hartshorne　raises　such　questions　to
Dewey　as　follows：How　can　a　universe　devoid　as　a　whole　of
consciousness　or　significance　be“carried　forward”by　the　consciousness
of　some　of　its　parts？　How，　being　as　a　whole　without　value，
can　it　gain　value　from　the　parts？And　how　can　the　universe，　as
it　is　not　a　volitional　being，“do”　anything　in　the　sense　here
relevant？（BH，45）As　is　clear　in　these　questions，　the　core　of
his　organic－social　analogy　lies，　therefore，　in　the　fact　that“our
satisfaction　can　form　part　of　a　cosmic　good　that　is　lasting”（BH，
45）．Not　as　a　mere　means　to　our　life，　he　goes　further　to　say，
is　the　divine　life　to　be　thought　of，　but　as　a　superior　life　to
which　we　can　also　be“in　the　relation　of　means”（BH，45－6）．
Conversely，　this　means　that　we　are　mow　completely　understood
by　someone　who　is　an　all－understanding　being，　being　everlastingly
actual．
　　　　　Hartshorne’sunderstanding　of　the　possibility　of　Praxis，
vis－a－vis　that　of　Dewey’sas　thus　explicated，　is　best　elaborately
concluded　in　the　following：
Dewey　is　greatly，　and　justifiably，　concerned　about　the
failure　of　traditional　religion　to　enter　whole－heartedly
upon　the　task　of　social　amelioration．　He　believes　that
super－naturalism　turns　attention　away　from　the“values
that　inhere　in　the　actual　connections　of　human　being
with　one　another”or　from“the　sweep　and　depth　of　the
implications　of　natural　human　relation．”（BH，50）
To　hold　that　this　ideal　is　based　upon　the　actuality　of　a
perfect　understanding　is　not　at　all　to　fall　into　the　error，
so　properly　condemned　by　Dewey，　of　destroying　the
meaning　of　the　ideal　as　that　which　we　might　accomplish．
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For　here　is　one　ideal　that　could　never　correspond　to　actu－
ality－unless　there　exists　a　God．（BH，47）
　　　　　Thus　Hartshorne　can　reject，観’漉De蕨？y，　such　theism　as
would　divorce　God　from　nature，　spirituality　from　materiality，
working　havoc　with　orthodox　ethics（BH，50）．Hartshorne’s
neo－classical　theism　is　appreciative　of　whatever　is　positively
significant　in　Dewey’snaturalistic　humanism．　If　so，　we　contend，
it　has　to　include　in　itself　Hisamatsu’sZen　atheistic　explication
of　the　livable　aspect　of　the　pragmatic　value　of　human　nature．
Otherwise，　it　seems　to　us，　it　would　lose　the　object　of　its
rational　defense，　the　aspect　that　the　rationally　def6nsible　aspect
of　the　pragmatic　value　presupPoses．
　　　　　2．Go4（rr八「ature　What　I　have　elucidated　in　the　above　in
reference　to　Hartshorne’sunderstanding　of　the　possibility　of
praxis，　has，　mUtαtis〃麗α磁s，　some　correlation　to　what　Hartshrone
says　about　the　beauty　of　the　creatures：
The　value　of　the　world　does　not　reside　merely　in　there
being　a　single　pe㎡ect　understanding　of　the　individuals　in
that　world，　but　also　in　the　aesthetic　richness　arising　from
the　variety　and　intensity　of　the　experiences　of　those
individuals．（BH，47）
This　passage　is　significant　in　that童t　shows　a　theistic　inclusion
of　the　intrinsic　value　of　nature．　It　is　in　line　with　this　that
Hartshorne　accounts　for　the　phrase　deus　sive　netura　following
Spinoza．　He　further　states：“God，　I　hold，　is　an　artist　fostering
and　loving　the　beauty　of　the　creatures，　the　harmonies　and
intensities　of　their　experiences，　as　data　for　his　own”（CSPM，
309）．Thus　the　heart　of　Christendom，　which　Hartshome　sees　as
deusθs’caritas，　as　taught　by　Jesus，　is　consistently　brought
together　with　the　intellect　of　Spinoza．　Hartshorne　thinks　it　his
fortune　that　he　no　longer　has　to　choose　between　Spinoza　and
Jesus．　For　the　reasons　which　prevented　Spinoza　from　regarding
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nature　not　only　as　God　but　as　the　God　of　love，　in　his　view，
can　be　proved　as　erroneous　in　the　light　of　the　new　science　and
the　new　logic，　Whitehead’sphilosophy　as　uniquely　elucidated
by　him　as“panentheism．”
　　　　　　Hartshorne’sdoctrine　of　panentheism　consists　of　two
elements：（1）every　individual　in　nature　is　in　some　degree　akin
to　the　human　being　either　as　inferior　or　as　superior；（2）nature
as　a　whole，　as　the　inclusive　individual，　can　only　be　conceived
as　superior，　and　this　in　mmimal　sense（BH，50）．　Thus　panentheism
means　that　God　is　both　the　system　of　dependent　things　or
effects（i．e．，（1）；cf．　Spinoza’s“natzara　neturata　”）and　something
independent　of　it　（i．e．，　（2）；cf．　Spinoza’s　“natura　naturans”）
（DR，90）．　It　is　distinct　from　traditional　pantheism，　the　view
that　God　is　merely　the　cosmos，　in　all　aspects　inseparable　from
the　system（e．g．，Spinoza’s“natura　neturans”as　God　as　substance
and　free　cause　necessitating“netura　naturata”as　the　modes　of　the
attributes　of　God　contained　in　Himself）；it　distinguishes　itself
also　from　traditional　theism，　the　belief　that　God　is　not　the
system，　but　is　in　all　aspects　independent（e，g．，Thomas’notion
of　God　as　ipsum　esse錫伽゜stens）（cf．　DR，90）．
　　　　　From　this　perspective　of　panentheism，　it　turns　out　that
Dewey，　on　the　one　hand，　is　confusedly　antagonistic　to　theism
because　of　what　in　reality　is　a“radical　corruption”of　theism
（BH，50）．　On　the　other，　he　fails　to　see　the　danger　that“something
which　participated　in　the　partiality　of　my　ego　is　held－without
full　recognition　of　the　fact－to　be　the　only　standard　by　which
that　partiality　may　be　judged”（BH，53）．Fleeing　the　divine
tyranny，　humanism　may　only　be　appalled　by　other　tyrannies
which　take　its　place，　i．e．，aphilosophical　system　and　the　group
tyranny．　But　all　the　evils，　including　the　group　tyranny，　contained
in（albeit　neither　intended　nor　caused　by）the　cosmic　reality，
are，　in　Hartshorne’sview，“in　spite　of　this（cosmic）meaning，
not　because　of　it”（CSPM，317）．
　　　　　Because　of　his　narrow－mindedness　or　lack　of　adequate
understanding　of　new　theism，　Dewey，　as　Hartshorne　critically
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assumes，　has“no　eager　delight　and　no　burning　passion　to
penetrate　her［nature’s］secrets”（BH，56）－and　this　with　all
his　mild　sense　of　her　grandeur　and　fascination．　For　Dewey，
nature　as　a　whole　need　not　be　supposed　conscious；he　has
sought　to　lead　people　from　supematuralism　to　a“not　too　egregiously
atheistic　naturalism”（BH，56）．It　is，　however，　Hartshorne’s
humorous　appreciation　of　Dewey　to　state　concerning　a　subtle，
rather　paradoxical，　relationship　of　process　philosophy　to　American
pragmatism　as　follows：“It　is　possible　that，　somewhat　indirectly
at　least，　he　may　prove　a　principal　creator　of　what　may　appear
theistic　naturalism”（BH，56）．
Conclusions：
　　　　　Iknow　no　better　conclusion　of　our　discussion　in　Section
III　than　Hartshorne’　s　elaborate　critique　of　both　Dewey　and
supernaturalism　in　these　words：
Dewey　and　traditionalists　agree　in　giving　pantheism　short
shrift．　Either　God　alone　or　nature　alone　appears　to　be　the
choice．　Again，　there　is　a　third　position：we　may　agree
with　Dewey　that　there　be　no　extra－natural　being，　and　yet
hold　that　there　must　be　in　nature　a　being　not　only　higher
than　others，　but　in　some　aspects　the　highest　possible，　the
supreme　or　maximal　being－supreme，　in　temporal　endurance
and　in　power　to　embrace　within　itself　the　content　and
value　of　the　beings．　This　supreme　natural　being　is　nature
herself，　taken　not　distributively，　but　as　an　integrated
individual．（BH，57）
　　　　　God　as　nature　herself　is　the　vision　achieved　by　the　panentheist
Hartshorne　accounting　for　the　source　of　the　pragmatic　value　of
human　nature　in　a　rationally　defensible　manner．　It　includes　in
itself　the　intrinsic　value，　Beauty，　of　the　universe，　including
humanity．　This　latter　value，　however，　realizes　itself　only　as　the
self－expression　of　a　free　and　bottomless　cause，　Formless　Self，　as
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was　most　clearly　elucidated　by　the　Zen　atheist　Hisamatsu（see
Section　II）．
　　　　　　Since　the　intrinsic　value，　Beauty，　is　the　most　fundamental
value　of　all　values，露ゴs　presuφPosedαs　zoθ〃as　includedうツGα！．
When　we　attend　to　the　mode　of　this　value，　Beauty，　being
presupposed　by　God，　we　find　ourselves　concerned，　with　the
Zennist　Hisamatsu，　with　the“livable”aspect　of　the　pragmatic
value　of　human　nature，　Praxis．　However，　when　we　recognize
that　whatever　is　Mesゆpased　in　the　universe　as　the　ground　of　all
values　is　o’once　to　be　the　object　of　God’sbenevolent　inclusion
into　the　bosom　of　God’s　actuality，　we誼im，　with　the　ne（ンーclassical
panentheist　Hartshorne，　the　validity　of　the“rationally”defensible
aspect　of　the　pragmatic　value　inherent　in　human　nature－with
much　confidence．　For　this　validity　is　an“at　once”validity　shot
through　not　only　with　the　Eastern　or　Zennist　but　also　with　the
Western　or　Christian　orientations．28a　It，　I　believe，　is　the　very
thing　which　is　required　for　conceiving　and　constructing　in　a
really　convincing　manner　what　Hans　Kting　refers　to　as“a
Global　Ethic”today　inasmuch　as“We　all　have　the　responsibility
for　a　better　world　order．”29
　　　　　1n　my　own　opinion，　however，　we　just　need　at　the　base　of
ourselves　the鋤er　of　vindicating　the　said　“at　once”　validity　of
the　two　aspects　of　the　pragmatic　value　of　human　nature．　This
ρ伽θ7is　God　as　the　one　who　alone　can　and　actually　does微）々θ
in　a　supreme　fashion　our　craturely　loyalty／fidelity／truthfulness
in　the　matter　of　Praxis　as　the“source”（arche）of　the　intended
instrumental　value　of　human　nature　or　Goodness．　Our　two
authors　do　not　touch　upon　this　important　issue，　though，　as　I
critically　mentioned　earlier．30
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Dwight　Goddard　and　introd．　by　Huston　Smith（Boston：Beacon，
1970），pp．22－60．　See　also　D．　T．　Suzuki，＆sαys　in　Zen　BndZihism，
First　Series（New　York：Grove，1961），　pp．118－62，　Cf．　Bhikshu
Sangharakshita，ノ1　Suruey　oア鋤‘s〃1（Boulder，　COL：Sham　bhala，
1980），pp．　107－22．
　　Insofar　as　the　Formless　Self（or　Emptiness），according　to
Mahayana　Buddhism　in　general　and　Hisamatsu　in　particular，　is
not　to　be　hypostatized　as　the　ultimate，　eternal　substance　or
ideal　but　is　to　be　realizedαs“me，”it　is　of　fundamental　axiological
significance．　What　I　primarily　mean　by　axiology　is　not　the
usual　scholarly　sense　of　the　term－－embracing　the　element　of
“intentionality”in　religious　experiences，　as　when　Frederick　J．
Streng　states：“．．．they［religious　experiences　as　psycho－socio－
physical　processes］establish　priorities　and　they　are　called　religious
because　they　are　experienced　and　defended　as　ult㎞ately　significant
by　a　person　or　a　community”（“Understanding　Christian　and
Buddhist　Personal　Transformation：Luther’sJustification　by
Faith　and　the　Indian　Pe㎡ection　of　Wisdom，”Bnddhist－Christian
Stasdies，　Vol．2，1982，17；italics　his），If　we　take　axiology
primarily　tO　mean　intentiOnality　Or’θ10S　in　religiOUs　experienCes，
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then　we　will　have　to　stop　using　it　when　it　comes　to　dealing
with　Buddhism．　For　its　major　emphases　are　on　Emptiness　or
nonsubstantiality　or　radical　relationality　of　all　things　and　No－mind
or　existential　break－through　of　the　desiderative　structure　of
human　existence．　In　this　sense　Masao　Abe　is　right　when　he
criticizes　Streng　by　saying，　“．．．Suchness　is　realized　neither
through　religious　intentionality　nor　in　terms　of　value　orientation，
but　is　realized　only　by　overcoming　all　religious　intentionality
and　all　value　orientation”（℃omments　on　Christian　and　Buddhist
Personal　Transformation，”op．cit．，48－49）．　However，　if　we
might　take　axiology　primarily　to　mean　the　Self－to－se壮relationship，
as　mentioned　earlier，　then　we　should　regard　Abe’stotal　negation
of　axiology　as　untenable　and　Streng’sunderstanding　of　amat〃mn
as“?高垂狽凵@of　essential　value”（ibid．，39）as　incorrect．　However，
if　I　am　correct，　Abe　might　be　meaning　the　same　thing　as　my
notion　of　intrinsic　value　by　his　wording　of“a　transaxiological
structure”iAbe，　op．cゴ’．，49）and　Streng　might　be　also　implying
the　same，　though　mixed　up　with　his　intentionality－axiology，
when　he　states：“All　beings　are　empty　of　essential　value［in　the
sense　of　own　being］，　including　the　bodhisattva．　At　the　same
time，　all　beings　in　their　interrelatedness，　that　is，　in　their
Suchness，　have　value［in　the　sense　of　the　Self－torself，　intrinsic，
relationship］　to　the　extent　that　the　interrelatedness　does　not
suggest　attachment，　but　manifests　enlightenment”（Streng，
ゴ6ゴと1．，　42）．
Shin，　ichi　Hisamatsu，“Zen：Its　Meaning　for　Modern　Civilization，”
7劾Etzstan　1漁b’，　New　Series，1，1，　Sept．1965，31；hereinafter
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　Shin’ichi　Hisamatsu，“Satori（Selbsterwachen）．Zum　post－modemen
Menschen，”in　Seiichi　Yagi　und　Ulrich　Luz（eds．），　Gott　in
lapan（MUnchen：Chr．　Kaiser，1973），　p．136．
　　See　Alfred　North　Whitehead，　Process　and　1～eality，　Corrected
Edition，　eds．，D．　R．　Griffin　and　D．　W．　Sherburne（New　York：
Free　Press，1978），pp．343－51；New　York：Macmillan，　pp．
521－33．
　　Katsumi　Takizawa，万翅mo　genten：乃n〃tanuern（The　Origin　of
Freedom：Immanuel）（Tokyo：Shinkyo　Shuppansha，1969），pp．
13－15，199－215．See　also　his　critique　of　Hisamatsu　from　the
Logos　Christological　perspective　in　B厩々yδ’o　Kiriszaokyb（Buddhism
and　Christianity，1950）now　contained　in　Takizawa　1（atsumi
Chosakztshit（Collected　Works）VII（Kyoto：Hozokan，1973），　pp．
249－362．His　critique　of　Hisamatsu，　which　was　an　epock－making
event　in　the　the　history　of　Buddhist－Christian　dialogue　in　Japan
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24．　See　my　article“Principles　for　Interpreting　Christ／Buddha：
　　　Katsumi　Takizawa　and　John　B．　Cobb，　Jr．，”Bnddhis’－Christian
　　　Stndies，　3　（1983），　71．
25．　The　Writings　of　Wi〃iam　lames（New　York：Modern　Library，
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28a．　This　grasp　of　the“at　once”validity　of　the　two　aspects　of　the
　　　pragmatic　value　may　correspond（although　within　the　purview
　　　of　the　metaphysical一α〃n－religious　axiology　of　human　nature　in
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and　which　exists　and　has　meaning　only　in　concrete　human
situations．　It　has　a　double　connection　with　reality　since　the
value　structure　springs　from　empirical　qualities　and　the　object
in　which　it　is　embodied　is　part　of　the　reality　we　live　in．　But　on
the　other　hand，　values　cannot　be　reduced　to　the　empirical
qualities　that　support　them　nor　to　the　value　objects　in　which
they　are　embodied．　The　possibility　of　new　value　objects　is
always　open”（VWzat　Is　Va！ue～〔La　Salle，几：Open　Court，1971〕，
PP．164刊65）．　In　our　case」this　issue　of　axiological”openness”has
been　explored　at　the　deeper　levels　than　the　level　of　the　pragmatic
value：i．e．，intrinsic　and　intended　instrumental　values　as　they
are　considered　in　telms　of　the　metaphysical　ultimate卿”Fonnless
Self”and　the　religious　ultimate（7zta“the　all－ipclusive　love　of
God．”
　　Hans　KUng　and　Karl－Josef　Kuschel，・4、　Global　E伽c’丁加
Declaration　oア漉θParliament　oアthe　VVorld、Religt’伽（New　York：
Continuum，1993），p．18．
　　Cf，“My　intuition　on　this　point〔i．e．，the　usage　of　the　term
ferce　in　a　religious　context〕is　that　Hartshorne　is　so　concerned
to　say　something‘meaningful’about　God　that　some　of　the
mystery　of　the　divine　is　lost（although　Hartshorne　does　locate
the　mystery　in　the　divine　actuality）”（William　E．　Kaufman，　The
αase　for　Gαd，　St．　Louis，　MO：Chalice　Press，1991，　p．103）。
